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                                                            Λαμία 20/10/2016 
 
«Υπεύθυνη Δήλωση μη λογοκλοπής και ανάληψης προσωπικής ευθύνης» 
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υπάρχουν στο πρωτότυπο ή μεταφρασμένες) είτε με παράφραση, έχουν δηλωθεί κατάλληλα και 
ευδιάκριτα στο κείμενο με την κατάλληλη παραπομπή και η σχετική αναφορά περιλαμβάνεται στο 
τμήμα των βιβλιογραφικών αναφορών με πλήρη περιγραφή. Αναλαμβάνω πλήρως, ατομικά και 
προσωπικά, όλες τις νομικές και διοικητικές συνέπειες που δύναται να προκύψουν στην περίπτωση 
κατά την οποία αποδειχθεί, διαχρονικά, ότι η εργασία αυτή ή τμήμα της δεν µου ανήκει διότι είναι 
προϊόν λογοκλοπής.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 The adequacy of efficient wireless protocols, improved sensors, cheaper 
processors, and a bevy of startups and established companies developing the 
necessary management and application software has finally made the concept of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) mainstream. The connected devices on internet have 
surpassed the population of human beings in Earth in 2011. By 2020 these devices 
are expected to number between 25 billion and 50 billion. These will include all the 
types of consumer electronics, machine tools, industrial equipment, cars, appliances, 
and a number of devices likely not yet invented. 
For the new technological era that we are passing, the cyber security for these 
devices must grow rapidly, with the same speed rate as the devices grow. Otherwise 
a lot of issues with serious impact will occur.In this master thesis’ following chapters 
the cyber security of Internet of Things devices will be analyzed. 
In the first chapters we will analyze the internet of things at every aspect. Then 
we will continue to mention the connection models of IoT.At the next chapters we will 
mention IoT attack surface, top IoT vulnerabilities and countermeasures and 
methodologies of penetration testing. 
The following chapters will include and analyze the necessity of cyber security 
for IoT devices, IoT vulnerabilities and a research use case where the findings of 
vulnerable IoT devices will be represented. Security challenges, such as 
confidentiality and privacy issues will be analyzed and almost every aspect of the 
cyber security issues surrounding the internet of things device. 
At the last chapter will be made a use case research for vulnerable devices 
which will be represented geographically and a proof which will show that full access 
was gained to them. 
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
Καθώς η ανθρωπότητα τεχνολογικά εξελίσσεται με γοργούς ρυθμούς, 
ταυτόχρονα συμβαδίζει με ακόμη γρηγορότερους ρυθμούς η νέα τεχνολογική εποχή 
που ονομάζεται η εποχή των Internet of Things ή αλλιώς, το ίντερνετ των 
πραγμάτων. Στις επόμενες σελίδες γίνεται η εισαγωγή αυτού που τις διαβάζει στην 
νέα αυτήν τεχνολογική εποχή, αναλύοντας έννοιες και απαντώντας σε ερωτήματα 
όπως τι είναι το ίντερνετ των πραγμάτων , που θα είναι χρήσιμο για την 
ανθρωπότητα ,  γιατί είναι αναγκαία η μετάβαση μας σε αυτήν την νέα εποχή, πως θα 
ωφεληθούν οι επιχειρήσεις από αυτό και άλλα αρκετά ενδιαφέροντα ερωτήματα. 
Η εργασία όμως αυτή έχει ως σκοπό όμως να αναλύσει και να εξηγήσει στο 
μέγιστο δυνατόν τα προβλήματα που θα δημιουργηθούν ταυτόχρονα με αυτήν την 
ραγδαία ανάπτυξη του ίντερνετ των πραγμάτων όσον αφορά στην ιδιωτικότητα και 
στην κυβερνοασφάλεια. Θα εξηγηθούν οι ευπάθειες αυτώ των συσκευών αναλυτικά, 
τι μπορούν να κάνουν οι ειδικοί ασφαλείας για να τις εξαλείψουν όσο γίνεται, τις 
επιπτώσεις που θα έχουν αυτές οι ευπάθειες και σχεδόν κάθε τι που μπορεί να 
προκύψει και αναφέρεται στην ασφάλεια του ίντερνετ των πραγμάτων. 
Στο τελευταίο μέρος της εργασίας γίνεται με ειδικές μηχανές αναζήτησης και 
λειτουργικά συστήματα κυβερνοασφάλειας γεωγραφική εύρεση ευπαθών τέτοιων 
συσκευών και συστημάτων. Επίσης σε κάποιες από αυτές δίνεται μέσα από 
στιγμιότυπα οθόνης η απόδειξη ότι καταφέραμε να αποκτήσουμε μη 
εξουσιοδοτημένη είσοδο σε αυτά πραγματοποιώντας αλλαγή σε ρυθμίσεις και 
έχοντας πλήρη έλεγχο των συσκευών, είτε βρίσκονταν σε οικιακό περιβάλλον είτε σε 
δημόσιους χώρους είτε ακόμη και σε βιομηχανικό περιβάλλον. Για λόγους 
ιδιωτικότητας  και ασφάλειας των προσωπικών δεδομένων των χρηστών έχει γίνει 
απόκρυψη ορισμένων στοιχείων. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 INTERNET OF THINGS OVERVIEW 
The internet has revolutionized the computers and the communications the 
last decades. Since 1960s with the first launch of ARPANET with many few users, 
the internet nowadays is used by more of the 40 % of the entire population of the 
earth. 
With so many devices connected and people connected to the Internet, what 
will be the future?  The future is called “The Internet of Things”. And what is the 
Internet of Things? This is the first question we need to answer. 
The term Internet of Things refers to the use of standard Internet protocols for 
the human-to-thing or thing-to-thing communication in embedded networks. 
Sometimes the Internet of Things referred to as ubiquitous networking and computing 
.Another simple approach of the term Internet of Things is the network of physical 
objects—devices, vehicles, buildings and other 
items embedded with electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity that 
enables these objects to collect and exchange data 
The original concept and more scientific term was proposed by Kevin Ashton 
at the Auto-ID Center at MIT in 1999. The Internet of Things is an informational 
network that allows the look-up of information about real-world objects by means of a 
unique ID called Electronic Product Code (EPC) and a resolution mechanism (ONS), 
to a network of sensors, actuators and autonomous objects interacting with each 
other directly. 
Despite the variety of definitions of the Internet of Things, the concept is 
similar. All of the definitions describe scenarios in which network connectivity and 
computing capability extends to a constellation of objects, devices, sensors and 
everyday items that are not ordinarily considered to be computers. This allows the 
devices to generate, exchange and consume data, often with minimal human 
intervention. 
For the companies the current potential market for the Internet of Things is 
huge but not so visible in our everyday lives. It is considered from a survey from 
Cisco that in 2020 there will be around 50 billion devices connected to the Internet 
and all these will be potential IoT devices and sensors. So in every second of the 
next 4-5 years 57.000 devices will be connected to the Internet. In financial terms, 
the market is measured in Trillions of dollars with estimates at 9 Trillion dollars by 
2020. In the short-term, growth to 2018, current projections are for a 300% growth in 
profits from incremental profits due to IoT. Furthermore, this is being projected and 
reported across all the major vertical markets such as Banking, Retail, Health, 
Transport, Manufacturing, Utilities and Government. Therefore, in both the short and 
long term, financial growth projections are staggering.  Currently, Asia leads the way 
with 40% of Machine-to-Machine connections (M2M). This isn’t surprising, because 
China has already committed $603 Billion towards machine-to machine connections 
leaving the USA and EU well behind. Recently, in March 2015 the UK launched a 
major government sponsored initiative to encourage IoT research, 
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development and implementation. The goal of the UK IoT project is to encourage 
business to adopt this new revolutionary technology. 
 
 
Below are some Internet of Things real world sector applications: 
 Smart Cities – Traffic Management, Waste Management, Structural Health, 
noise urban maps, intelligent transportation systems 
 Smart Environment – Earthquake early detection, Forest fire detection, Air 
quality and Pollution detection, Avalanche and landside prevention 
 Smart Water – Water quality, leakage prevention, reservoir level 
management, river floods detection and prevention 
 Security and Emergencies – Perimeter access controls, Radiation and liquid 
Detection, Explosive and Hazardous gases detection, emergency service 
management 
 Smart Retail – Supply chain control, NFC payments, smart product 
management, Vending machine remote management 
 Smart Logistics – Quality of shipment condition, item tracking, fleet tracking, 
geo-positioning, shipment/deliver management 
 Industrial Control – M2M application, Environment control (HVAC), 
temperature control, ozone presence, vehicle auto-diagnosis, Warehouse 
stock location 
 Smart agriculture – wine quality monitoring, crop irrigation, green house 
control, park management 
 Smart Animal Farming – offspring care, animal tracking, environment 
monitoring, toxic gas levels, animal health care monitoring, food history 
management 
 Smart Homes – temperature and humidity control, remote automation, 
lightning and ambiance control, energy efficiency, intrusion detection systems, 
fire and safety alarms 
 eHealth – fall detection, sports monitoring, patient surveillance, equipment 
monitoring, health and fitness monitors, ultra-violet detection monitors. 
 
These are just some of the more obvious IoT application already in common use 
today and they are evolving rapidly as the only bounds are the limits of innovation 
and creativity. 
 
It is not just industry and consumer vertical markets that stand to be revolutionized, 
one other major business sector is already repositioning itself to reap the benefits, as 
it understands very well the concept of risk versus reward, and that is marketing. 
Analyze the picture and write the internet of things market 
 
Internet of things as it is mentioned above will grow and will be a part to a lot of 
critical aspects of everyday life and critical infrastructures. 
Banking and finance sectors will use insurance based monitoring and billing, smart 
payments and smart loan applications and processing. 
At public services the defense and the homeland security of a country will use 
internet of thins device. 
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Manufacturing sector can use internet of things devices for efficiency monitoring, 
failure analysis, proactive maintenance, supply chain optimization and security, 
robotics, RFID logistics and connected devices, industrial control systems and video 
monitoring. 
In Smart cities internet of things will increase applications for smart parking, 
environmental monitoring, smart lighting and watering, traffic management, police 
command and control and security monitoring. 
At retail service internet of things devices will be used for automated checkout, 
sensors on shelves, smart fitting rooms and smart mirrors, proximity advertising, 
smart vending machines, security alarm and environmental sensors. 
At energy infrastructures internet of things will bring the development of smart grid, 
demand on response, safety monitoring and fault detection, industrial control 
systems and security monitoring. 
With all the above applications is presumed that internet of things will be the “heart” 
of a lot of critical infrastructures and either we see them or not, behind in every 
aspect in our everyday life in the near future. 
The web so far has gone through four evolutionary stages. The first stage was 
the research stage when the web was called the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency Network (ARPANET) and was used for academic and research purposes. 
The second stage of the evolution of the web was called the “gold rush”. At this 
phase of evolution almost every company focused on the needs to share information 
on the Internet so that people had the chance learn about their products and 
services. The third evolution stage transformed the web from static data to 
transactional information, where products and services could be sold and bought and 
services delivered. This phase was called the “dot-com” boom and bust. 
The fourth phase of evolution where we are now is the “social” or “experience” 
web where big companies popular and gain profit by allowing people to communicate 
each other connect and share information. Together with the “social” and 
“experience” web the internet of things can attach and make the user’s experience 
more efficient by adding machine to machine communication and human to machine 
communication among with the human to human communication. Internet of thins 
become critical for human progression because people desire to live healthy fulfilling, 
and comfortable lives for themselves, their families, and those they care about. By 
combining the ability of the next evolution of the Internet (IoT) to sense, collect, 
transmit, analyze, and distribute data on a massive scale with the way people 
process information, humanity will have the knowledge and wisdom it needs not only 
to survive, but to thrive in the coming months, years, decades, and centuries. 
 All these makes the current potential market for Internet of Things 
huge. The confluence of efficient wireless protocols, improved sensors, cheaper 
processors, and a number of startups and established companies developing the 
necessary management and application software has finally made the concept of the 
Internet of Things mainstream. A number of companies and research organizations 
have offered a wide range of projections about the potential impact of IoT on the 
Internet and the economy during the next five to ten years. Cisco, for example, 
projects more than 24 billion Internet–connected objects by 2019, Morgan Stanley, 
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however, projects 75 billion networked devices by 2020. Looking out further and 
raising the stakes higher, Huawei forecasts 100 billion IoT connections by 
2025.McKinsey Global Institute suggests that the financial impact of IoT on the global 
economy may be as much as $3.9 to $11.1 trillion by 2025. However, with all these 
new connecter devices, cyber security for Internet of Things becomes an essential 
aspect for every vendor, organization and consumer who use them.More attack 
vectors and more possibilities for harmful attacks will target this devices and their 
users. So it is critical to move fast to address this rising security concern in order not 
to face inevitable disaster.  
 At the summer of 2016 Vodafone published its global survey of 
business sentiment regarding innovation and investment in the Internet of Things. 
The survey was conducted by Circle Research in April and May 2016 and involved 
more than 1,096 companies around the world. The results were: 
 89% of companies investing in IoT have increased their budgets over the last 
12 months 
 76% of all companies interviewed believe that taking advantage of IoT 
technologies will be critical for the future success of any organisation 
 63% of IoT adopters are seeing “significant” returns on investment, up from 
59% in last year’s Repor 
 IoT investment now accounts for 24% of the average IT budget, on a par with 
cloud computing or data analytics. 
 48% of companies interviewed are using IoT technologies to support large-
scale business transformation, rising to 61% in the Asia-Pacific region 
 52% of consumer electronics companies interviewed are using IoT 
technologies as the basis for a new generation of applications for connected 
homes 
 46% of all companies interviewed said they intend to develop new IoT-based 
products and services over the next two years. 
For improving the security issues of the IoT the companies answered: 
 42% will train their staff 
 41% will recruit security specialists 
 38% will establish a clear contingency plan 
 45% will establish clear security best practice and guidelines for staff 
 42% will make security a major part of request for proposal requirements 
 40% will work with a specialist security provider 
Reviewing the results concerning the improve of security for IoT vendors it is 
disappointing that even the half of them takes the security concerns serious, even the 
investments rates are rapidly growing up.  
1.2 INTERNET OF THINGS COMMUNICATION MODELS 
1.2.1 DEVICE TO DEVICE COMMUNICATIONS 
The device to device communication model represents two or more devices 
that directly connect and communicate between one another, through an 
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intermediary application server. These devices communicate with many types of 
networks, including IP networks or the Internet. Often, however these devices use 
protocols like Bluetooth, Z-Wave, or ZigBee  to establish direct device-to-device 
communications. 
These devices to device networks allow devices to be attached to a particular 
communication protocol to communicate and exchange messages to achieve 
functionality. This communication model is commonly used in applications like home 
automation systems, which typically use small data packets of information to 
communicate between devices with relatively low data rate requirements. Residential 
IoT devices like light bulbs, light switches, thermostats, and door locks normally send 
small amounts of information to each other (e.g. a door lock status message or turn 
on light command) in a home automation scenario. This device to device 
communication approach illustrates many of the functionality challenges that the IOT 
manufactures face. From the user’s point of view, this often means that underlying 
device-to-device communication protocols are not compatible, forcing the user to 
select a family of devices that employ a common protocol. For example, the family of 
devices using the Z-Wave protocol is not natively compatible with the ZigBee family 
of devices. While these incompatibilities limit user choice to devices within a 
particular protocol family, the user benefits from knowing that products within a 
particular family tend to communicate well. 
 
Image 1.Device to Device Communication Model 
 
1.2.2 DEVICE TO CLOUD COMMUNICATIONS 
In a device to cloud communication model, the IoT device connects directly to 
an Internet cloud service like an application service provider to exchange data and 
control message traffic. This approach frequently takes advantage of existing 
communications mechanisms like traditional wired Ethernet or Wi-Fi connections to 
establish a connection between the device and the IP network, which ultimately 
connects to the cloud service. This communication model is employed by some 
popular consumer IoT devices like smaet Thermostats   and Smart televisions. In the 
case of the Thermostats, the device transmits data to a cloud database where the 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:01:46 EET - 137.108.70.7
 
 13 
data can be used to analyze home energy consumption. Further, this cloud 
connection enables the user to obtain remote access to their thermostat via a 
smartphone or Web interface, and it also supports software updates to the 
thermostat. The same process exists in the Smart televisions technology, the 
television uses an Internet connection to transmit user viewing information to the 
television vendor for analysis and to enable the interactive features of the TV. In 
these cases, the device to cloud model adds value to the end user by extending the 
capabilities of the device beyond its native features. However, functionality 
challenges can arise when attempting to integrate devices made by different 
manufacturers. Frequently, the device and cloud service are from the same vendor.  
 
Image 2.Device to Cloud Communication Model  
1.2.3 DEVICE TO GATEWAY MODEL 
In the device to gateway model or the device to application layer gateway 
(ALG) model, the IoT device connects through an ALG service as a channel to reach 
a cloud service. This means that there is an application software operating on a local 
gateway device, which acts as a proxy between the device and the cloud service and 
provides security and other functionality such as data or protocol translation. Several 
forms of this model are found in consumer devices. In many cases, the local gateway 
device is a smartphone running an app to communicate with a device and relay data 
to a cloud service. This is often the model which is employed in popular consumer 
items like personal fitness trackers. These devices do not have the native ability to 
connect directly to a cloud service, so they frequently rely on smartphone application 
software to serve as a middleman gateway to connect the fitness device to the cloud. 
The other form of this device to gateway model is the emergence of “hub” 
devices in home automation applications. These are devices that serve as a local 
gateway between individual IoT devices and a cloud service, but they can also bridge 
the communication functionality gap between devices themselves. This 
communication model is used in situations where the smart objects require 
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interoperability with non-IP  devices. Sometimes this approach is taken for integrating 
IPv6-only devices, which means a gateway is necessary for legacy IPv4-only devices 
and services. In other words, this communications model is frequently used to 
integrate new smart devices into a legacy system with devices that are not natively 
interoperable with them.  
A downside of this approach is that the necessary development of the application-
layer gateway software and system adds complexity and cost to the overall system.
 
Image 3. Device to Gateway Communication Model  
 
1.2.4 BACK END DATA SHARING MODEL  
The backend data sharing model refers to a communication architecture that 
enables users to export and analyze smart object data from a cloud service in 
combination with data from other sources. This architecture supports the user’s 
desire for granting access to the uploaded sensor data to third parties. This approach 
is an extension of the single device to- cloud communication model, which can lead 
to data silos where IoT devices upload data only to a single application service 
provider. A backend sharing architecture allows the data collected from single IoT 
device data streams to be aggregated and analyzed. For example, a corporate user 
in charge of an office complex would be interested in consolidating and analyzing the 
energy consumption and utilities data produced by all the IoT sensors and Internet 
enabled utility systems on the premises. Often in the single device to cloud model, 
the data each IoT sensor or system produces sits in a standalone data silo. An 
effective back-end data sharing architecture would allow the company to easily 
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access and analyze the data in the cloud produced by the whole spectrum of devices 
in the building. Also, this kind of architecture facilitates data portability needs. 
Effective backend data sharing architectures allow users to move their data when 
they switch between IoT services, breaking down traditional data silo barriers. The 
backend data sharing model suggests a federated cloud services approach cloud 
applications programmer interfaces (APIs) are needed to achieve interoperability of 
smart device data hosted in the cloud. 
 
Image 4. Back-end Data Sharing Mode 
1.2.5 IPv6 AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
Although there is not a specific total amount of IoT device that will exist by 
2025, specialists considered to be 100 billion. As the Internet of Things continues to 
grow, devices that require true end to end Internet connectivity will not be able to rely 
on IPv4, the protocol most Internet services use today. They will need a new 
enabling technology. IPv6 is a long-anticipated upgrade to the Internet’s original 
fundamental protocol IPv6 is a long-anticipated upgrade to the Internet’s original 
fundamental protocol the Internet Protocol (IP), which supports all communications 
on the Internet. The IPv6 is necessary because the Internet is running out of original 
IPv4 addresses. While IPv4 can support 4.3 billion devices connected to the Internet, 
IPv6 with 2 to the 128th power addresses, is for all practical purposes inexhaustible. 
This represents about 340 trillion addresses, which satisfies the demand of the 
estimated 100 billion IoT devices going into service in the near future. Key challenges 
for IoT developers are that IPv6 is not natively interoperable with IPv4 and most low 
cost software that is available for embedding in IoT devices implements only IPv4. 
Many experts believe, however, that IPv6 is the best connectivity option and will 
allow IoT to reach its potential. 
 1.3 THE DATA OF INTERNET OF THINGS 
Because the generation and analysis of data is so essential to the IoT, 
consideration must be given to protecting data throughout its lifecycle. Managing 
information at this level is complex because data will flow across many administrative 
boundaries with different policies and intents. Individuals will surely have different 
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privacy goals than corporate entities, which in turn will have different goals than 
government or other organizations. Oftentimes, data is processed or stored on edge 
devices that have highly limited capabilities and are vulnerable to sophisticated 
attacks.  
Privacy implications must also be considered to include developing an 
understanding of potential privacy issues when many different sources aggregate to 
a single point. Privacy controls are required at various points across the IoT 
ecosystem, particularly at point of user consent to data capture, transfer of data 
between IoT partners and at the points within the system that the data is stored and 
used.  
Given the various technological and physical components that truly make up an IoT 
ecosystem, it is good to consider the IoT as a system-of-systems. The architecting of 
these systems that provide business value to organizations will often be a complex 
undertaking, as enterprise architects work to design integrated solutions that include 
edge devices, applications, transports, protocols, and analytics capabilities that make 
up a fully functioning IoT system. This complexity introduces challenges to keeping 
the IoT secure, and ensuring that a particular instance of the IoT cannot be used as a 
jumping off point to attack other enterprise information technology (IT) systems. 
1.4 THE IOT ECOSYSTEM 
The Internet of Things ecosystem will be described below ,containing processors 
types, operating systems and other things that give the ability to a device to be smart 
and internet connected: 
 Processors: Arm, Cortex-M, ARC, Quark etc. 
 Operating Systems : Embedded Linux , uCLinux, Android Auto, Yokto , 
freeRTOS, QNX, OpenWRT, CarPlay, Snappy Ubuntu, RIOT , Contiki, mbed, 
Android, TinyOS 
 Platforms: Rapsberry Pi, Arduino, BeagleBone 
 Device Types: Virtual Things, Access points, Routers ,Aggregators,ZETA 
Platforms 
 IOT Protocols:CoAp, LWM2M, One M2M, NFC, 802.15.4 Zigbee, XMPP-Iot, 
HTTP, Zwave, 6LowPAN, MQTT, Bluetooth, Ethernet, SATCOM, PKE ,AMQP, 
DSRC, DDS,802.11 Wifi 
 Integration Frameworks: Apple HOMEKIT, Temboo, CROWNSet, Thingspeak 
,Wemo 
 APIs: COSM,IOBridge.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1 COMMON IOT SECURITY PROBLEMS 
The mobility and the easy communication between internet of things device is 
a big advantage, but simultaneously a big disadvantage too. 
In this section we will assess the security of some of the common IoT 
technologies that use to communicate. For the purpose of this assessment, we 
assume that the attacker is within range of the device’s wireless transmission and 
can interact with it. These attacks can be achieved from outside of the building, for 
example in a parking lot, with an antenna. Some of the attacks require the attacker to 
be on the same local wireless network. All of the following technologies mentioned 
are potentially prone to radio jamming, allowing an attacker to disrupt connectivity to 
the device. 
2.1.1 Wi-Fi networks (802.11) 
Getting access to the home’s Wi-Fi network allows an attacker to perform 
attacks against any connected device. The Wi-Fi standard Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) is considered to be insecure and should not be used. Even though Wi-Fi 
Protected Access II (WPA2) encryption is widely adapted, attackers can still brute-
force weak passwords with a dictionary attack and get access to the network. Some 
broadband providers do not allow the user to change the Wi-Fi password, potentially 
helping attackers to brute-force accounts. Some vendors use Wi- Fi Protected Setup 
(WPS), which has long been found to be vulnerable to WPS PIN brute-forcing. Some 
manufacturers implemented client isolation security mode for Wi-Fi access points, 
but internet providers don’t usually enable this option in home routers to allow 
devices to interoperate within a home network. As a result, devices connected to the 
network can typically access each other, not just the gateway, which is a good and 
desired layout. 
2.1.2 Z-Wave protocol 
The Z-Wave protocol itself is considered to be secure. However, researchers 
have previously found implementation flaws affecting specific manufacturers that 
allowed them to take full control of devices in Z-Wave networks. “This vulnerability 
was not due to a flaw in the Z-Wave protocol specification, but because of an 
implementation error in disabling the use of temporary key after initial network key 
exchange during inclusion of a node to the network,” stated the research paper’s 
authors Behrang Fouladi and Sahand Ghanoun. Similar implementation pitfalls may 
affect other smart home device manufacturers. 
2.1.3 ZigBee 
Similarly, to Z-Wave, the ZigBee protocol is considered secure from its ZigBee 
PRO version onwards. There have been some security concerns regarding support 
for plain text over-the-air (OTA) key exchange in certain profiles, which is meant to 
be used by manufacturers when provisioning units for the first time. Researchers 
have found that certain manufacturers have misused this feature. Another security 
concern lies in the protocol’s shared network key. By stealing one of the nodes of a 
ZigBee network, an attacker could dump the node’s internal memory and retrieve this 
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network key, giving them access to the network. Such a scenario may be particularly 
dangerous in certain configurations used for home networks that have sensors 
deployed outside of the house, such as an external lamp. 
2.1.4 Powerline 
The two main home automation protocols that make use of Powerline are: 
• X10 (also supported over RF) 
• Insteon (A hybrid of RF and Powerline) 
One of the main concerns around these Powerline protocols is that signals 
can easily bleed over to the next connected networks, allowing people near the 
network, such as neighbors, to spy on these communications. In order to counter 
this, these protocols and other Powerline-based systems typically support encryption. 
2.1.5 Bluetooth Low Energy 
Bluetooth Low Energy, also known as Bluetooth Smart, is often used for smart 
home devices that do not require an internet connection, such as door locks or light 
bulbs. Users can typically control these devices using a mobile phone and a 
dedicated app. The Bluetooth Smart standard is quite flexible and leaves space open 
for faulty implementations that could allow attackers to remotely control these 
devices. For example, recently, the Bluetooth LE implementation of a wearable 
fitness bracelet had been completely reverse-engineered, allowing exposing the 
device to attack. 
2.1.6 Other RF protocols 
Some vendors have implemented their own radio protocol for their devices. 
This may result in protocols that are vulnerable to similar attacks, as with the 
previously described standards. For example, LightwaveRF is considered to be 
vulnerable to replay attacks. 
2.2 MAJOR SECURITY CONCERNS 
Below are some key findings which an analysis of them raises major security 
concerns for Internet of things Devices. During Symantec’s research, they found 
issues such as following: 
• Around 19 percent of all tested mobile apps that are used to control IoT devices did 
not use Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections to the cloud 
• None of the analyzed devices provided mutual authentication between the client 
and the server 
• Some devices offered no enforcement and often no possibility of strong passwords 
• Some IoT cloud interfaces did not support two-factor authentication (2FA) 
• Many IoT services did not have lock-out or delaying measures to protect users’ 
accounts against brute-force attacks 
• Some devices did not implement protections against account harvesting 
• Many of the IoT cloud platforms included common web application vulnerabilities 
• We found ten security issues in fifteen web portals used to control IoT devices 
without performing any deep tests. Six of them were serious issues, allowing 
unauthorized access to the backend systems. 
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• Most of the IoT services did not provide signed or encrypted firmware updates, if 
updates were provided at all 
As a conclusion, there are still many devices that do not use encrypted 
communications or proper authentication. It is crucial that smart home devices, or 
any IoT devices for that matter, use mutual authentication and encryption. IoT 
devices often have less memory and slower CPUs, so they may be unable to use the 
same encryption methods as a traditional computer does, but that is no excuse for 
the lack of strong encryption. There are efficient cryptographic methods designed for 
small scale devices, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which can be used. 
that is run on a smart device, be it the firmware or application, should be verified 
through a chain of trust. 
Protecting the code and securing the device creates a trusted baseline. 
Vendors should provide a simple and automated way for users to update their device 
in order to ensure that common security issues can be fixed quickly and efficiently. 
IoT devices should only accept signed firmware as standard. Where applicable, 
security analytics features should be provided in the overall device management 
strategy. Cloud control interfaces present another weak point of many IoT. Users 
should not be forced to use cloud setups if all they want to do is to do basic tasks 
such as turning on the lights in their homes. Vendors need to allow strong, complex 
passwords to be used. Restricting authentication to simple four-digit PIN codes does 
not sufficiently protect the device, especially if this issue is combined with the lack of 
any brute-force protection mechanism. Even when strong passwords are use, we 
found that common web application vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection or remote 
file inclusion, are often present in these cloud control portals as well. Vendors need 
to ensure that their services are not vulnerable to the OWASP’s top ten web 
application vulnerabilities. For IoT devices such as smoke alarms, it is also crucial 
that the vendor has considered what happens when there is a power outage or the 
network gets jammed. Will the user be notified or will the malfunctioning safety 
device go unnoticed? 
In the near future, a lot of people could have a variety of devices connected to 
their home networks. This will lead to smarter smart hubs that allow commands 
based on logical conditions, such as “if this, then that”. This adds to the complexity of 
the problem, as now a problem in one device can trigger the shutdown of another.
 There are already applications available which allow you to do exactly this. In 
order to perform the actions, the application needs to be authorized to access the 
smart devices. This makes the smart hub an ideal central point of attack, as changing 
such rules could have a catastrophic effect on all devices connected to the network. 
With all of these issues affecting the devices on different levels, it is currently not 
easy to deploy multiple smart devices in a secure fashion at home.  
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2.3 PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
2.3.1 INTERNET OF THINGS PRIVACY BACKGROUND 
Respect for privacy rights and expectations is integral to ensuring trust in the 
Internet, and it also impacts the ability of individuals to speak, connect, and choose in 
meaningful ways. These rights and expectations are sometimes framed in terms of 
ethical data handling, which emphasizes the importance of respecting an individual’s 
expectations of privacy and the fair use of their data. The Internet of Things can 
challenge these traditional expectations of privacy. IoT often refers to a large network 
of sensor enabled devices designed to collect data about their environment, which 
frequently includes data related to people.  
This data presumably provides a benefit to the device’s owner, but frequently 
to the device’s manufacturer or supplier as well. IoT data collection and use becomes 
a privacy consideration when the individuals who are observed by IoT devices have 
different privacy expectations regarding the scope and use of that data than those of 
the data collector. Seemingly harmless combinations of IoT data streams also can 
jeopardize privacy. When individual data streams are combined or correlated, often a 
more invasive digital portrait is painted of the individual than can be realized from an 
individual IoT data stream.  
For example, a user’s Internet-enabled toothbrush might capture and transmit 
innocuous data about a person’s tooth-brushing habits. But if the user’s refrigerator 
reports the inventory of the foods he eats and his fitness-tracking device reports his 
activity data, the combination of these data streams paint a much more detailed and 
private description of the person’s overall health. This data-aggregation effect can be 
particularly potent with respect to IoT devices because many produce additional 
metadata like time stamps and geolocation information, which adds even more 
specificity about the user. 
 In other situations, the user might not be aware that an IoT device is 
collecting data about the individual and potentially sharing it with third parties. This 
type of data collection is becoming more prevalent in consumer devices like smart 
televisions and video game devices. These kinds of products have voice recognition 
or vision features that continuously listen to conversations or watch for activity in a 
room and selectively transmit that data to a cloud service for processing, which 
sometimes includes a third party. A person might be in the presence of these kinds of 
devices without knowing their conversation or activities are being monitored and their 
data captured. These kinds of features may provide a benefit to an informed user, but 
can pose a privacy problem for those who are unaware of the presence of the 
devices and have no meaningful influence over how that collected information is 
used. Independent of whether the user is aware of and consents to having their IoT 
data collected and analyzed, these situations highlight the value of these 
personalized data streams to companies and organizations seeking to collect and 
capitalize on IoT information.  
The demand for this information exposes the legal and regulatory challenges 
facing data protection and privacy laws. These kinds of privacy problems are critical 
to address because they have implications on our basic rights and our collective 
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ability to trust the Internet. From a broad perspective, people recognize their privacy 
is intrinsically valuable, and they have expectations of what data can be collected 
about them and how other parties can use that data. This general notion about 
privacy holds true for data collected by Internet of Things devices, but those devices 
can undermine the user’s ability to express and enforce privacy preferences. If users 
lose confidence in the Internet because their privacy preferences aren’t being 
respected in the Internet of Things, then the greater value of the Internet may be 
diminished. 
2.3.2 UNIQUE PRIVACY ASPECTS OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS. 
Generally, privacy concerns are amplified by the way in which the Internet of 
Things expands the feasibility and reach of surveillance and tracking. Characteristics 
of IoT devices and the ways they are used redefine the debate about privacy issues, 
because they dramatically change how personal data is collected, analyzed, used, 
and protected. The traditional “notice and consent” online privacy model, in which 
users assert their privacy preferences by interacting directly with information 
presented on a computer or mobile screen (e.g. by clicking “I agree”), breaks down 
when systems provide no mechanism for user interaction. IoT devices frequently 
have no user interface to configure privacy preferences, and in many IoT 
configurations users have no knowledge or control over the way in which their 
personal data is being collected and used. This causes a gulf between the user’s 
privacy preferences and the data-collecting behavior of the IoT device. There might 
be less incentive for IoT vendors to offer a mechanism for users to express their 
privacy preferences if they regard the data collected as being non-personal data. 
However, experience shows that data not traditionally considered personal data 
might actually be personal data or become personal data when combined with other 
data.  
Assuming an effective mechanism can be developed to enable a user to 
express informed consent of their privacy preferences to IoT devices, that 
mechanism needs to handle the large number of IoT devices a user must control. It is 
not realistic to think that a user will directly interact with each and every IoT device 
they encounter throughout the day to express their privacy preferences. Instead, 
privacy interface mechanisms need to be scalable to the size of the IoT problem, 
while still being comprehensive and practical from a user perspective. The Internet of 
Things can threaten a person’s expectations of privacy in common situations. There 
are social norms and expectations of privacy that differ in public spaces versus 
private spaces, and IoT devices challenge these norms. For example, IoT monitoring 
technologies like surveillance cameras or location tracking systems that normally 
operate in public spaces are migrating into traditionally private spaces like the home 
or personal vehicle in which our expectations of privacy are very different. In doing 
so, they challenge what many societies recognize as the “right to be left alone” in 
one’s home or private space. Also individuals’ expectations of privacy in spaces they 
consider to be public (e.g. parks, shopping malls, train stations) are being challenged 
by the increased nature and extent of monitoring in those spaces. 
IoT devices often operate in contexts in which proximity exposes multiple 
people to the same data collection activity. For example, a geolocation tracking 
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sensor in an automobile would record location data about all occupants of the 
vehicle, whether or not all the occupants want their location tracked. It may even 
track individuals in nearby vehicles. In these kinds of situations, it might be difficult or 
impossible to distinguish, much less honor, individual privacy preferences. Big data 
analytics applied to aggregated personal data already represents a substantial risk of 
privacy invasion and potential discrimination. This risk is amplified in the Internet of 
Things by the scale and greater. intimacy of personal data collection. IoT devices can 
collect information about people with an unprecedented degree of specificity and 
pervasiveness; aggregation and correlation of these data can create detailed profiles 
of individuals that create the potential for discrimination and other harms. The 
sophistication of this technology can create situations that expose the individual to 
physical, criminal, financial or reputational harm. The ubiquity, familiarity, and social 
embrace of many IoT devices might create a false sense of security and encourage 
individuals to divulge sensitive or private information without full awareness or 
appreciation of the potential consequences of doing so. 
2.3.3 IOT PRIVACY QUESTIONS  
These privacy issues would be challenging even if the interests and motivations 
of all of the participants in the IoT ecosystem were well aligned. However, we know 
that there can be unbalanced or unfair relationships and interests between those who 
are exposed to personal data collection and those who aggregate, analyze, and use 
the data. The data source might see an unwelcome intrusion into private space, often 
without consent, control, choice, or even awareness. The data collector, however, 
might consider this a beneficial resource that can add value to products and services 
as well as provide new revenue streams. Because IoT challenges our notions of 
privacy in new ways, key questions need to be asked when re-evaluating online 
privacy models in the context of IoT. Some questions that have been raised include: 
 How do we resolve the marketplace relationship between data sources and 
data collectors in the context of IoT? Personal data has personal and 
commercial value that sources and collectors value differently, both 
individually and in aggregate; both parties have legitimate interests that may 
conflict. How might those distinct interests be expressed in a way that leads to 
fair and consistent rules for both sources and collectors concerning access, 
control, transparency, and protection? 
 How can privacy policies and practices be made readily available and 
understandable in the context of IoT? What are the alternatives to the 
traditional “notice and consent” privacy model that will address the unique 
aspects of the Internet of Things? What is an effective model for expressing, 
applying, and enforcing individual privacy preferences and multi-party 
preferences? Could such a multi-party model be constructed, and if so, what 
would it look like? How might it be applied to specific circumstances involving 
individual privacy preferences? Is there a market for outsourcing the 
management of privacy settings to commercial services designed to put users’ 
preferences into effect? Is there a role for a privacy proxy that would express 
and enforce a user’s preferences across an array of devices, while eliminating 
the need for direct interaction with each one? 
 Privacy norms and expectations are closely related to the social and cultural 
context of the user, which will vary from one group or nation to another. Many 
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IoT scenarios involve device deployments and data collection activities with 
multinational or global scope that cross social and cultural boundaries. What 
will that mean for the development of a broadly applicable privacy protection 
model for the Internet of Things? How can IoT devices and systems be 
adapted to recognize and honor the range of privacy expectations of the users 
and different laws? 
 How can we encourage IoT device manufacturers to integrate privacy-by-
design principles into their core values? How do we foster the inclusion of 
consumer privacy considerations in every phase of product development and 
operation? How do we reconcile functionality and privacy requirements? In 
principle, manufacturers should expect that privacy-respecting products and 
practices build long-term customer trust, satisfaction, and brand loyalty. Is that 
a sufficiently compelling motivation, when matched against the competing 
desires for design simplicity and speed to market? Should devices be 
designed with default settings configured for the most conservative data 
collection mode (i.e. opt out of data collection by default)? 
 How should we protect data collected by IoT that appears not to be personal 
at the point of collection or has been “de-identified”, but may at some point in 
the future become personal data (e.g. because data can be re-identified or 
combined with other data 
 
The Internet of Things creates unique challenges to privacy that go beyond the 
data privacy issues that currently exist. Strategies need to be developed to respect 
individual privacy choices across a broad spectrum of expectations, while still 
fostering innovation in new IoT technology. 
 
2.4 The IOT security Challenge 
The term security subsumes a wide range of different concepts. In the first 
place, it refers to the basic provision of security services including confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, authorization, non-repudiation, and availability. These 
security services can be implemented by means of different cryptographic 
mechanisms, such as block ciphers, hash functions, or signature algorithms. For 
each of these mechanisms, a solid key management infrastructure is fundamental to 
handling the required cryptographic keys. 
Ensuring the security, reliability, resilience, and stability of Internet applications 
and services is critical to promoting trust and use of the Internet. As users of the 
Internet, we need to have a high degree of trust that the Internet, its applications, and 
the devices linked to it are secure enough to do the kinds of activities we want to do 
online in relation to the risk tolerance associated with those activities. The Internet of 
Things is no different in this respect, and security in IoT is fundamentally linked to the 
ability of users to trust their environment. If people don’t believe their connected 
devices and their information are reasonably secure from misuse or harm, the 
resulting erosion of trust causes a reluctance to use the Internet. This has global 
consequences to electronic commerce, technical innovation, free speech, and 
practically every other aspect of online activities. Indeed, ensuring security in IoT 
products and services should be considered a top priority for the sector. 
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As we increasingly connect devices to the Internet, new opportunities to 
exploit potential security vulnerabilities grow. Poorly secured IoT devices could serve 
as entry points for cyberattack by allowing malicious individuals to re-program a 
device or cause it to malfunction. Poorly designed devices can expose user data to 
theft by leaving data streams inadequately protected. Failing or malfunctioning 
devices also can create security vulnerabilities. These problems are just as large or 
larger for the small, cheap, and ubiquitous smart devices in the Internet of Things as 
they are for the computers that have traditionally been the endpoints of Internet 
connectivity. Competitive cost and technical constraints on IoT devices challenge 
manufacturers to adequately design security features into these devices, potentially 
creating security and long-term maintainability vulnerabilities greater than their 
traditional computer counterparts. 
Along with potential security design deficiencies, the sheer increase in the 
number and nature of IoT devices could increase the opportunities of attack. When 
coupled with the highly interconnected nature of IoT devices, every poorly secured 
device that is connected online potentially affects the security and resilience of the 
Internet globally, not just locally. For example, an unprotected refrigerator or 
television in the US that is infected with malware might send thousands of harmful 
spam emails to recipients worldwide using the owner’s home Wi-Fi Internet 
connection. 
Day by day, we become more connected and dependent on IoT devices for 
essential services, and we need the devices to be secure, while recognizing that no 
device can be absolutely secure. This increasing level of dependence on IoT devices 
and the Internet services they interact with also increases the pathways for 
wrongdoers to gain access to devices. Perhaps we could unplug our Internet-
connected TVs if they get compromised in a cyber-attack, but we can’t so easily turn 
off a smart utility power meter or a traffic control system or a person’s implanted 
pacemaker if they fall victim to malicious behavior. This is why security of IoT devices 
and services is a major discussion point and should be considered a critical issue. 
We increasingly depend on these devices for essential services, and their behavior 
may have global reach and impact. 
When thinking about Internet of Things devices, it is important to understand 
that security of these devices is not absolute. IoT device security is not a binary 
proposition of secure or insecure. Instead, it is useful to conceptualize IoT security as 
a spectrum of device vulnerability. The spectrum ranges from totally unprotected 
devices with no security features to highly secure systems with multiple layers of 
security features. In an endless cat-and-mouse game, new security threats evolve, 
and device manufacturers and network operators continuously respond to address 
the new threats. The overall security and resilience of the Internet of Things is a 
function of how security risks are assessed and managed. Security of a device is a 
function of the risk that a device will be compromised, the damage such compromise 
will cause, and the time and resources required to achieve a certain level of 
protection. If a user cannot tolerate a high degree of security risk as in the case of the 
operator of a traffic control system or person with an implanted, Internetenabled 
medical device, then she may feel justified in spending a considerable amount of 
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resources to protect the system or device from attack. Likewise, if she is not 
concerned that her refrigerator might be hacked and used to send spam messages, 
then she may not feel compelled to pay for a model that has a more sophisticated 
security design if it makes the device more costly or complicated. 
Several factors influence this risk assessment and mitigation calculation. 
Factors include having a clear understanding of the present security risks and the 
potential future risks; the estimated economic and other costs of harm if the risks are 
realized; and the estimated cost to mitigate the risks. While these kinds of security 
tradeoffs are often made from an individual user or organizational perspective, it is 
also important to consider the interrelatedness of IoT devices as part of a larger IoT 
ecosystem. The networked connectivity of IoT devices means that security decisions 
made locally about an IoT device can have global impacts on other devices. As a 
matter of principle, developers of smart objects for the Internet of Things have an 
obligation in ensuring that those devices do not expose either their own users or 
others to potential harm. As a matter of business and economics, vendors have an 
interest in reducing their cost, complexity, and time to market. For example, IoT 
devices that are high–volume, low–margin components that already represent a cost 
added to that of the product in which they are embedded are becoming quite 
common; adding more memory and a faster processor to implement security 
measures could easily make that product commercially uncompetitive. In economic 
terms, lack of security for IoT devices results in a negative externality, where a cost is 
imposed by one party (or parties) on other parties. A classic example is pollution of 
the environment, where the environmental damage and cleanup costs (negative 
externalities) of a polluter’s actions are borne by other parties. The issue is that the 
cost of the externality imposed on others is not normally factored into the decision-
making process, unless, as is the case with pollution, a tax is imposed on the polluter 
to convince him to lower the amount of pollution. In the case of information security, 
as discussed by Bruce Schneier, an externality arises when the vendor creating the 
product does not bear the costs caused by any insecurity; in this case, liability law 
can influence vendors to account for the externality and develop more security 
products. 
 
Iot devices tend to differ from traditional computers and computing devices in 
important ways that challenge security issues: 
 Many Internet of Things devices, such as sensors and consumer items, are 
designed to be deployed at a massive scale that is orders of magnitude 
beyond that of traditional Internet connected devices. As a result, the potential 
quantity of interconnected links between these devices is unprecedented. 
Further, many of these devices will be able to establish links and communicate 
with other devices on their own in an unpredictable and dynamic fashion. 
Therefore, existing tools, methods, and strategies associated with IoT security 
may need new consideration. 
 Many IoT deployments will consist of collections of identical or near identical 
devices. This homogeneity magnifies the potential impact of any single 
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security vulnerability by the sheer number of devices that all have the same 
characteristics. For example, a communication protocol vulnerability of one 
company’s brand of Internet-enabled light bulbs might extend to every make 
and model of device that uses that same protocol or which shares key design 
or manufacturing characteristics. 
 Many Internet of Things devices will be deployed with an anticipated service 
life many years longer than is typically associated with high-tech equipment. 
Further, these devices might be deployed in circumstances that make it 
difficult or impossible to reconfigure or upgrade them; or these devices might 
outlive the company that created them, leaving orphaned devices with no 
means of long-term support. These scenarios illustrate that security 
mechanisms that are adequate at deployment might not be adequate for the 
full lifespan of the device as security threats evolve. As such, this may create 
vulnerabilities that could persist for a long time. This is in contrast to the 
paradigm of traditional computer systems that are normally upgraded with 
operating system software updates throughout the life of the computer to 
address security threats. The long-term support and management of IoT 
devices is a significant security challenge. 
 Many IoT devices are intentionally designed without any ability to be 
upgraded, or the upgrade process is cumbersome or impractical. For example, 
consider the 2015 Fiat Chrysler recall of 1.4 million vehicles to fix a 
vulnerability that allowed an attacker to wirelessly hack into the vehicle. These 
cars must be taken to a Fiat Chrysler dealer for a manual upgrade, or the 
owner must perform the upgrade themselves with a USB key. The reality is 
that a high percentage of these autos probably will not be upgraded because 
the upgrade process presents an inconvenience for owners, leaving them 
perpetually vulnerable to cybersecurity threats, especially when the 
automobile appears to be performing well otherwise. 
 Many IoT devices operate in a manner where the user has little or no real 
visibility into the internal workings of the device or the precise data streams 
they produce. This creates a security vulnerability when a user believes an IoT 
device is performing certain functions, when in reality it might be performing 
unwanted functions or collecting more data than the user intends. The 
device’s functions also could change without notice when the manufacturer 
provides an update, leaving the user vulnerable to whatever changes the 
manufacturer makes. 
 Some IoT devices are likely to be deployed in places where physical security 
is difficult or impossible to achieve. Attackers may have direct physical access 
to IoT devices. Anti-tamper features and other design innovations will need to 
be considered to ensure security. 
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2.5 SECURITY CHALLENGES 
There are many challenges to deploying a secure IoT implementation, and 
many of the existing security technologies on the market will play a role in mitigating 
IoT risks within an enterprise. However, the IoT also introduces new challenges to 
security engineering. Many of these would benefit from targeted research or industry 
collaboration to to determine the optimal long-term approaches to resolution. 
2.5.1 Many IoT Systems are poorly designed and implemented, using diverse protocols and 
technologies that create complex configurations.  
The IoT encompasses edge devices, messaging and transport protocols, 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), data analytics, storage, software, and 
various other technology concepts. Edge devices themselves are complex, 
consisting of multiple layers of technology and requiring an understanding of 
hardware, firmware, software and a plethora of protocols. All of this can be applied to 
myriad use cases across many industries.  
Before being able to secure a system, it is important to first understand the 
functional and technological details of the system to be secured. This will require 
security engineers to work closely with the developers of the IoT capability to 
introduce security requirements early in the design process. Using a methodical 
systems security engineering approach for each IoT implementation within an 
enterprise is recommended.  
Taking a systems security engineering approach to IoT implementations 
allows designers to identify areas of complexity that can be simplified. As an 
example, limiting implementations to the use of as few protocols and touch points as 
possible. 
2.5.2 Lack of mature IoT technologies and business processes  
Standards supporting the IoT have not yet been fully developed, leaving the 
market open to competing platforms, protocols, and interfaces. This lack of standards 
drives increased complexity which can introduce vulnerabilities and provides 
attackers with a way to infiltrate the enterprise.  
2.5.3 Limited guidance for lifecycle maintenance and management of IoT devices  
Guidance on the secure configuration of the limited capability operating 
systems that underlie many IoT edge devices is limited or nonexistent.  
Performing firmware, software and patch updates for IoT devices will require a new 
approach with considerations given to identifying update provisioning obligations and 
responsibilities throughout the supply chain.  
Organization’s procuring IoT assets should also clearly understand and agree 
on the vendor’s model for licensing to ensure that they are able to continue receiving 
patches and software updates throughout the course of the IoT asset’s life. If IoT 
devices fall behind on required security updates, they will be much easier for 
attackers to exploit. In this regard, organizations should consider the likelihood that 
IoT devices will eventually become unsupported as phase-out dates come into play 
from each vendor.  
Keeping track of IoT devices and the software and firmware on each device is 
also an issue. The amount of IoT devices alone introduces a challenge to effectively 
managing them.  
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2.5.4 The IoT introduces unique physical security concerns  
Many IoT edge devices will be deployed in exposed environments, allowing 
attackers to more easily acquire them for further lab analysis. This is concerning 
because most IoT edge devices are limited in capability, requiring software-based 
solutions for the protection of sensitive material such as cryptographic keys.  
Attackers with sufficient resources can reverse engineer these edge devices. Ideally, 
the use of tamper-resistant protections would be implemented however this may not 
always be feasible. The fact that many IoT applications desire very low-cost devices 
causes a conflict with devices’ ability to withstand attacks and tampering.  
2.5.5 IoT privacy concerns are complex and not always readily evident.  
Some privacy concerns are not readily identifiable and some concerns are not 
solvable by simply enforcing confidentiality protections, identity or location to 
transactions.  
 
2.5.6 Limited best practices available for IoT developers  
Many IoT developers are not yet familiar with secure development best 
practices. The rush to create new IoT-based capabilities will likely result in limited 
focus on the security of the new functionality being created.  
 
2.5.7 There is a lack of standards for authentication and authorization of IoT edge devices  
Requirement for low-power and wearable devices bring a wealth of new, 
simpler wireless protocols, which often meshes together and do not implement 
mature and secure encryption and authentication; these protocols can be attacked 
“on the fly” and without physical contact  
Some IoT devices have no authentication capabilities while others have limited 
support. Very few have capabilities that support multi-factor authentication. It is also 
not clear how useful multi-factor authentication for IoT edge devices will be in 
general. One of the primary benefits of traditional 2-factor authentication is that one 
of the “factors” is “out-of-band” relative to the other. But, in IoT devices, both of the 
credential (e.g., keys) may need to be stored in the same device, losing the out-of-
band benefit.  
Although some standards or commercial options are available (e.g., certificate 
authentication, commercial or semi-commercial identity providers such as Google, 
there is a lack of ability to create device-specific profiles and authorization options 
and the privacy implications of using these services providers has not been fully 
explored.  
2.5.8 There are no best practices for IoT-based incident response activities.  
Organizations must be able to plan for the compromise of IoT devices, keys 
and certificates. This includes performing forensic analysis on compromised systems 
and devices.  
 
2.5.9 Audit and Logging standards are not defined for IoT components 
Monitoring  
IoT edge devices for security events poses unique difficulties. Many of these 
edge devices will be single-purpose sensors that may not be capable of tracking all 
interactions with the device. Other devices may be limited in their ability to instantiate 
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an RF connection for the purpose of sending audit logs, based on battery constraints. 
Obtaining near real-time situational awareness of the security posture of IoT devices 
will be difficult.  
Another challenge is aggregating log data from many widespread IoT 
segments into a single event management system, and then actually being able to 
derive some intelligence from the activities within each of these segments.  
 
2.5.10 Restricted interfaces available to interact IoT devices with security devices and 
applications. No focus yet on identifying methods for achieving situational awareness of the 
security posture of an organization’s IoT assets.  
Integrating IoT devices into an organization’s existing security system would provide 
situational awareness of the overarching security posture of the organization. 
Unfortunately, there are typically no interfaces made available to connect with 
existing SIEM systems, and options are typically limited for connecting with Identity 
and Access Management systems and other security systems. Given that this is the 
case, it is likely that intermediary products will soon rise to support brokering between 
IoT device pools and an organization’s security infrastructure.  
 
2.5.11 Security standards for platform configurations involving virtualized IoT platforms 
supporting multi-tenancy is immature.  
This involves use cases where the “cloud” stretches all the way out to the device 
(e.g., two businesses being hosted as tenants on the same physical IoT platform). 
This results in the need for lightweight, yet secure virtualization /isolation solutions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3.1 TOP 10 VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES 
At IoT security there is a misconception that It is all about the device, or the network 
or the clients .There are many surface areas involved and each of these need to be 
evaluated. 
A holistic approach is required and the elements to be considered are: 
 The Internet of Things Device 
 The Cloud 
 The Mobile Application 
 The Network Interfaces 
 The Software 
 Use of Encryption 
 Use of Authentication 
 Physical Security 
 USB ports 
Below we will analyze the top 10 categories that covers the entire device and all 
surface area to get a good assessment of overall security. 
1.Insecure Web Interface 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the web interface including 
internal and external users(Applciation Specific) 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses weak credentials, captures plain-text credentials or 
enumerates accounts to access the web interface. Attack could come from external 
or internal users.(Exploitability easy) 
Security Weakness: An insecure web interface can be present when issues such as 
account enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak credenitals are present. 
Insecure web interfaces are prevalent as the intent is to have these interfaces 
exposed only on internal networks, however threats from the internal users can be 
just as significant as threats from external users. Issues with the web interface are 
easy to discover when examining the interface manually along with automated 
testing tools to identify other issues such as cross-site scripting.(Detectability Easy) 
Technical Impacts: Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, 
lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device 
takeover.(Impact Severe) 
Bussiness Impacts: Consider the business impact of poorly secured web interfaces 
that could lead to compromised devices along with compromised customers. Could 
your customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed? 
 
Is My Web Interface Secure? 
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Checking for an Insecure Web Interface includes: 
 Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial 
product setup 
 Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts 
 Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery 
mechanisms or new user pages 
 Reviewing the interface for issues such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request 
forgery and sql injection. 
How do I make My web Interface Secure? 
A secure web interface requires: 
1. Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial 
setup 
2. Ensuring password recovery mechanisms are robust and do not supply an 
attacker with information indicating a valid account 
3. Ensuring web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or CSRF 
4. Ensuring credentials are not exposed in internal or external network traffic 
5. Ensuring weak passwords are not allowed 
6. Ensuring account lockout after 3 -5 failed login attempts 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: The web interface presents "Forgot Password" functionality which upon 
entering an invalid account informs the attacker that the account does not exist. Once 
valid accounts are identified, password guessing can begin for an indefinite amount 
of time if no account lockout controls exist. 
Account john@doe.com does not exist. 
 
Scenario #2: Web interface is susceptible to cross-site scripting. 
http://xyz.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script> ... Response from browser 
is an alert popup 
In the cases above, the attacker is able to easily determine if an account is valid or 
not and is also able to determine that the site is susceptible to cross-site scripting 
(XSS). 
 
 2 Insufficient Authentication/Authorization 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the web interface, mobile 
interface or cloud interface including internal and external users. 
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Attack Vectors: Attacker uses weak passwords, insecure password recovery 
mechanisms, poorly protected credentials or lack of granular access control to 
access a particular interface. Attack could come from external or internal users. 
Security Weakness: Authentication may not be sufficient when weak passwords are 
used or are poorly protected. Insufficient authentication/authorization is prevalent as 
it is assumed that interfaces will only be exposed to users on internal networks and 
not to external users on other networks. Deficiencies are often found to be present 
across all interfaces. Many Issues with authentication/authorization are easy to 
discover when examining the interface manually and can also be discovered via 
automated testing. 
Technical Impacts: Insufficient authentication/authorization can result in data loss or 
corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete 
compromise of the device and/or user accounts. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of compromised user accounts 
and possibly devices. All data could be stolen, modified, or deleted. Could your 
customers be harmed? 
Is My Authentication/Authorization Sufficient? 
Checking for Insufficient Authentication includes: 
 Attempting to use simple passwords such as "1234" is a fast and easy way to 
determine if the password policy is sufficient across all interfaces 
 Reviewing network traffic to determine if credentials are being transmitted in clear 
text 
 Reviewing requirements around password controls such as password complexity, 
password history check, password expiration and forced password reset for new 
users 
 Reviewing whether re-authentication is required for sensitive features 
Checking for Insufficient Authorization includes: 
 Reviewing the various interfaces to determine whether the interfaces allow for 
separation of roles. For example, all features will be accessible to administrators, 
but users will have a more limited set of features available. 
 Reviewing access controls and testing for privilege escalation 
 
How Do I Make My Authentication/Authorization Better? 
Sufficient authentication/authorization requires: 
1. Ensuring that the strong passwords are required 
2. Ensuring granular access control is in place when necessary 
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3. Ensuring credentials are properly protected 
4. Implement two factor authentication where possible 
5. Ensuring that password recovery mechanisms are secure 
6. Ensuring re-authentication is required for sensitive features 
7. Ensuring options are available for configuring password controls 
8. Ensuring credential can be revoked 
9. The app authentication is required 
10. The device authentication is required 
11. The server authentication is required 
12. Manage authenicated user id(credential info.) and the user's device id, the 
user's app id mapping table in the authentication server 
13. Ensuring that the authentication token/session key issuing to client is always 
different 
14. Ensuring that the user id, app id, device id is universally unique 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: The interface only requires simple passwords. 
Username = Bob; Password = 1234 
Scenario #2: Username and password are poorly protected when transmitted over 
the network. 
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46MTIzNA== 
In the cases above, the attacker is able to either easily guess the password or is able 
to capture the credentials as they cross the network and decode it since the 
credentials are only protected using Base64 Encoding. 
 
 3.Insecure Network Services 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the device via a network 
connection, including external and internal users. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses vulnerable network services to attack the device itself 
or bounce attacks off the device. Attack could come from external or internal users. 
Security Weakness: Insecure network services may be susceptible to buffer 
overflow attacks or attacks that create a denial of service condition leaving the device 
inaccessible to the user. Denial of service attacks against other users may also be 
facilitated when insecure network services are available. Insecure network services 
can often be detected by automated tools such as port scanners and fuzzers. 
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Technical Impacts: Insecure network services can result in data loss or corruption, 
denial of service or facilitation of attacks on other devices. 
 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of devices which have been 
rendered useless from a denial of service attack or the device is used to facilitate 
attacks against other devices and networks. Could your customers or other users be 
harmed? 
 
Are My Network Services Secure? 
Checking for Insecure Network Services includes: 
 Determining if insecure network services exist by reviewing your device for open 
ports using a port scanner 
 As open ports are identified, each can be tested using any number of automated 
tools that look for DoS vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities related to UDP services and 
vulnerabilities related to buffer overflow and fuzzing attacks 
 Reviewing network ports to ensure they are absolutely necessary and if there are 
any ports being exposed to the internet using UPnP. 
 
How Do I Secure My Network Services? 
Securing network services requires: 
1. Ensuring only necessary ports are exposed and available. 
2. Ensuring services are not vulnerable to buffer overflow and fuzzing attacks. 
3. Ensuring services are not vulnerable to DoS attacks which can affect the 
device itself or other devices and/or users on the local network or other 
networks. 
4. Ensuring network ports or services are not exposed to the internet via UPnP 
for example 
5. The abnormal service request traffic should be detected and blocked on 
service gateway layer 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: Fuzzing attack causes network service and device to crash. 
GET %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s HTTP/1.0 
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Scenario #2: Ports open to the internet possibly without the user's knowledge via 
UPnP. 
Port 80 and 443 exposed to the internet via a home router. 
In the cases above, the attacker is able to disable the device completely with an 
HTTP GET or access the device via the internet over port 80 and/or port 443. 
 
4.Lack of Transport Encryption 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the network the device is 
connected to, including external and internal users. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses the lack of transport encryption to view data being 
passed over the network. Attack could come from external or internal users 
Security Weakness: Lack of transport encryption allows data to be viewed as it 
travels over local networks or the internet. Lack of transport encryption is prevalent 
on local networks as it is easy to assume that local network traffic will not be widely 
visible, however in the case of a local wireless network, misconfiguration of that 
wireless network can make traffic visible to anyone within range of that wireless 
network. Many Issues with transport encryption are easy to discover simply by 
viewing network traffic and searching for readable data. Automated tools can also 
look for proper implementation of common transport encryption such as SSL and 
TLS. 
Technical Impacts: Lack of transport encryption can result in data loss and 
depending on the data exposed, could lead to complete compromise of the device or 
user accounts. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of exposed data as it travels 
across various networks. Data could be stolen or modified. Could your users be 
harmed by having their data exposed 
Do I use Transport Encryption? 
Checking for Lack of Transport Encryption includes: 
 Reviewing network traffic of the device, its mobile application and any cloud 
connections to determine if any information is passed in clear text 
 Reviewing the use of SSL or TLS to ensure it is up to date and properly 
implemented 
 Reviewing the use of any encryption protocols to ensure they are recommended 
and accepted 
 
How Do I Use Transport Encryption? 
Sufficient transport encryption requires: 
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1. Ensuring data is encrypted using protocols such as SSL and TLS while 
transiting networks. 
2. Ensuring other industry standard encryption techniques are utilized to protect 
data during transport if SSL or TLS are not available. 
3. Ensuring only accepted encryption standards are used and avoid using 
proprietary encryption protocols 
4. Ensuring the message payload encryption 
5. Ensuring the secure encryption key handshaking 
6. Ensuring received data integrity verification 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: The cloud interface uses only HTTP. 
http://www.xyzcloudsite.com 
Scenario #2: Username and password are transmitted in the clear over the network. 
http://www.xyzcloud.com/login.php?userid=3&password=1234 
In the cases above, the attacker has the ability to view sensitive data in the clear due 
to lack of transport encryption. 
 
5.Privacy Concerns 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the device itself, the network the 
device is connected to, the mobile application and the cloud connection including 
external and internal users. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, 
lack of transport encryption or insecure network services to view personal data which 
is not being properly protected or is being collected unnecessarily. Attack could come 
from external or internal users. 
Security Weakness: Privacy concerns generated by the collection of personal data 
in addition to the lack of proper protection of that data is prevalent. Privacy concerns 
are easy to discover by simply reviewing the data that is being collected as the user 
sets up and activates the device. Automated tools can also look for specific patterns 
of data that may indicate collection of personal data or other sensitive data. 
Technical Impacts: Collection of personal data along with a lack of protection of that 
data can lead to compromise of a user's personal data.. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of personal data that is collected 
unnecessarily or isn't protected properly. Data could be stolen. Could your customers 
be harmed by having this personal data exposed? 
Does My Device Present Privacy Concerns? 
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Checking for Privacy Concerns includes: 
 Identifying all data types that are being collected by the device, its mobile 
application and any cloud interfaces 
 The device and it's various components should only collect what is necessary to 
perform its function 
 Personally identifiable information can be exposed when not properly encrypted 
while at rest on storage mediums and during transit over networks 
 Reviewing who has access to personal information that is collected 
 Determining if data collected can be de-identified or anonymized 
 Determining if data collected is beyond what is needed for proper operation of the 
device (Does the end-user have a choice for this data collection?) 
 Determining if a data retention policy is in place 
 
How Do I Prevent Privacy Concerns? 
Minimizing privacy concerns requires: 
1. Ensuring only data critical to the functionality of the device is collected 
2. Ensuring that any data collected is of a less sensitive nature (i.e., try not to 
collect sensitive data) 
3. Ensuring that any data collected is de-identified or anonymized 
4. Ensuring any data collected is properly protected with encryption 
5. Ensuring the device and all of its components properly protect personal 
information 
6. Ensuring only authorized individuals have access to collected personal 
information 
7. Ensuring that retention limits are set for collected data 
8. Ensuring that end-users are provided with "Notice and Choice" if data 
collected is more than what would be expected from the product 
9. Ensuring the role based access control/authorization to the collected 
data/analyzed data is applied 
10. Ensuring that the analyzed data is de-identified 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: Collection of personal data. 
Date of birth, home address, phone number, etc. 
Scenario #2: Collection of financial and/or health information. 
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Credit card data and bank account information. 
In the cases above, exposure of any of the data examples could lead to identity theft 
or compromise of accounts. 
 
6.Insecure cloud Interface 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the internet. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, 
lack of transport encryption and account enumeration to access data or controls via 
the cloud website. Attack will most likely come from the internet. 
Security Weakness: An insecure cloud interface is present when easy to guess 
credentials are used or account enumeration is possible. Insecure cloud interfaces 
are easy to discover by simply reviewing the connection to the cloud interface and 
identifying if SSL is in use or by using the password reset mechanism to identify valid 
accounts which can lead to account enumeration. 
Technical Impacts: An insecure cloud interface could lead to compromise of user 
data and control over the device. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of an insecure cloud interface. 
Data could be stolen or modified and control over devices assumed. Could your 
customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed? 
 
Is My Cloud Interface Secure? 
Checking for an Insecure Cloud Interface includes: 
 Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial 
product setup 
 Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts 
 Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery 
mechanisms or new user pages 
 Reviewing the interface for issues such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request 
forgery and sql injection. 
 Reviewing all cloud interfaces for vulnerabilities (API interfaces and cloud-based 
web interfaces) 
 
How Do I Secure My Cloud Interface? 
A secure cloud interface requires: 
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1. Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial 
setup 
2. Ensuring user accounts cannot be enumerated using functionality such as 
password reset mechanisms 
3. Ensuring account lockout after 3- 5 failed login attempts 
4. Ensuring the cloud-based web interface is not susceptible to XSS, SQLi or 
CSRF 
5. Ensuring credentials are not exposed over the internet 
6. Implement two factor authentication if possible 
7. Detect or block the abnormal reqests/attempts 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: Password reset indicates whether account is valid. 
Password Reset "That account does not exist." 
Scenario #2: Username and password are poorly protected when transmitted 
over the network. 
Authorization: Basic S2ZjSDFzYkF4ZzoxMjM0NTY3 
In the cases above, the attacker is able to either determine a valid user account 
or is able to capture the credentials as they cross the network and decode them 
since the credentials are only protected using Base64 Encoding. 
 
7.Insecure Mobile Interface 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the mobile application. 
 Attack Vectors: Attacker uses multiple vectors such as insufficient authentication, 
lack of transport encryption and account enumeration to access data or controls via 
the mobile interface. 
Security Weakness: An insecure mobile interface is present when easy to guess 
credentials are used or account enumeration is possible. Insecure mobile interfaces 
are easy to discover by simply reviewing the connection to the wireless networks and 
identifying if SSL is in use or by using the password reset mechanism to identify valid 
accounts which can lead to account enumeration. 
Technical Impacts: An insecure mobile interface could lead to compromise of user 
data and control over the device. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact of an insecure mobile interface. 
Data could be stolen or modified and control over devices assumed. Could your 
customers be harmed? Could your brand be harmed? 
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Is My Mobile Interface Secure? 
Checking for an Insecure Mobile Interface includes: 
 Determining if the default username and password can be changed during initial 
product setup 
 Determining if a specific user account is locked out after 3 - 5 failed login attempts 
 Determining if valid accounts can be identified using password recovery 
mechanisms or new user pages 
 Reviewing whether credentials are exposed while connected to wireless networks 
 Reviewing whether two factor authentication options are available 
 
How Do I Secure My Mobile Interface? 
A secure mobile interface requires: 
1. Default passwords and ideally default usernames to be changed during initial 
setup 
2. Ensuring user accounts can not be enumerated using functionality such as 
password reset mechanisms 
3. Ensuring account lockout after an 3 - 5 failed login attempts 
4. Ensuring credentials are not exposed while connected to wireless networks 
5. Implementing two factor authentication if possible 
6. Apply mobile app obfuscation techinque 
7. Implement mbile app anti-tempering mechanism 
8. Ensuring the mobile app's memory hacking is possible 
9. Restrict the mobile app's execution on tempered OS environment 
 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: Password reset indicates whether account exist or not. 
Password Reset "That account does not exist." 
Scenario #2: Username and password are poorly protected when transmitted over 
the network. 
Authorization: Basic S2ZjSDFzYkF4ZzoxMjM0NTY3 
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In the cases above, the attacker is able to either determine a valid user account or is 
able to capture the credentials as they cross the network and decode them since the 
credentials are only protected using Base64 Encoding. 
 
8.Insufficient Security Configurability 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the device. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses the lack of granular permissions to access data or 
controls on the device. The attacker could also us the lack of encryption options and 
lack of password options to perform other attacks which lead to compromise of the 
device and/or data. Attack could potentially come from any user of the device 
whether intentional or accidental. 
Security Weakness: Insufficient security configurability is present when users of the 
device have limited or no ability to alter its security controls. Insufficient security 
configurability is apparent when the web interface of the device has no options for 
creating granular user permissions or for example, forcing the use of strong 
passwords. Manual review of the web interface and its available options will reveal 
these deficiencies. 
Technical Impacts: Insufficient security configurability could lead to compromise of 
the device whether intentional or accidental and/or data loss. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact if data can be stolen or modified 
and control over the device assumed. Could your customers be harmed? 
Is My Security Configurability Sufficient? 
Checking for Insufficient Security Configurability includes: 
 Reviewing the administrative interface of the device for options to strengthen 
security such as forcing the creation of strong passwords 
 Reviewing the administrative interface for the ability to separate admin users from 
normal users 
 Reviewing the administrative interface for encryption options 
 Reviewing the administrative interface for options to enable secure logging of 
various security events 
 Reviewing the administrative interface for options to enable alerts and 
notifications to the end user for security events 
 
How Do I Improve My Security Configurability? 
Sufficient security configurability requires: 
1. Ensuring the ability to separate normal users from administrative users 
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2. Ensuring the ability to encrypt data at rest or in transit 
3. Ensuring the ability to force strong password policies 
4. Ensuring the ability to enable logging of security events 
5. Ensuring the ability to notify end users of security events 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: No ability to enforce strong password policies. 
Admins and users are allowed to create passwords for their accounts. 
Scenario #2: No ability to enable encryption of data at rest. 
Password or other sensitive data stored on the device may not be encrypted. 
In the cases above, the attacker is able to use the lack of these controls to get 
access to user accounts with weak passwords or access data at rest which has 
protection. 
9.Insecure Software/Firmware 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has access to the device and/or the network 
the device resides on. Also consider anyone who could gain access to the update 
server 
 Attack Vectors: Attacker uses multiple vectors such as capturing update files via 
unencrypted connections, the update file itself is not encrypted or they are able to 
perform their own malicious update via DNS hijacking. Depending on method of 
update and device configuration, attack could come from the local network or the 
internet. 
Security Weakness: The lack of ability for a device to be updated presents a 
security weakness on its own. Devices should have the ability to be updated when 
vulnerabilities are discovered and software/firmware updates can be insecure when 
the updated files themselves and the network connection they are delivered on are 
not protected. Software/Firmware can also be insecure if they contain hardcoded 
sensitive data such as credentials. Security issues with software/firmware are 
relatively easy to discover by simply inspecting the network traffic during the update 
to check for encryption or using a hex editor to inspect the update file itself for 
interesting information. 
Technical Impacts: Insecure software/firmware could lead to compromise of user 
data, control over the device and attacks against other devices. 
Business Impacts: Consider the business impact if data can be stolen or modified 
and devices taken control of for the purpose of attacking other devices. Could your 
customers be harmed? Could other users be harmed? 
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Is My Software/Firmware Secure? 
 Note - It is very important that devices first and foremost have the ability to update 
and perform updates regularly. 
Checking for insecure software/firmware updates include: 
 Reviewing the update file itself for exposure of sensitive information in human 
readable format by someone using a hex edit tool 
 Reviewing the production file update for proper encryption using accepted 
algorithms 
 Reviewing the production file update to ensure it is properly signed 
 Reviewing the communication method used to transmit the update 
 Reviewing the cloud update server to ensure transport encryption methods are up 
to date and properly configured and that the server itself is not vulnerable 
 Reviewing the device for proper validation of signed update files 
 
How Do I Secure My Software/Firmware? 
Securing software/firmware require: 
1. Ensuring the device has the ability to update (very important, need secure 
update mechanism) 
2. Ensuring the update file is encrypted using accepted encryption methods 
3. Ensuring the update file is transmitted via an encrypted connection 
4. Ensuring the update file does not expose sensitive data 
5. Ensuring the update is signed and verified before allowing the update to be 
uploaded and applied 
6. Ensuring the update server is secure 
7. Implement the secure boot if possible (chain of trust) 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: Update file is transmitted via HTTP. 
http://www.xyz.com/update.bin 
Scenario #2: Update file is unencrypted and human readable data can be viewed. 
�v�ñ]��Ü��Qw�û]��ˇ3DP�Ö�∂]��ˇ3DPadmin.htmadvanced.htmalarms.
htm 
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In the cases above, the attacker is able to either capture the update file or capture 
the file and view its contents. 
 
10.Poor Physical Security 
Threat Agent: Consider anyone who has physical access to the device. 
Attack Vectors: Attacker uses vectors such as USB ports, SD cards or other storage 
means to access the Operating System and potentially any data stored on the 
device. 
Security Weakness: Physical security weaknesses are present when an attacker 
can disassemble a device to easily access the storage medium and any data stored 
on that medium. Weaknesses are also present when USB ports or other external 
ports can be used to access the device using features intended for configuration or 
maintenance. 
Technical Impacts: Insufficient physical security could lead to compromise of the 
device itself and any data stored on that device. 
Bussiness Impacts: Data could be stolen or modified and the device taken control 
of for purposes other than what was originally intended. Could your customers be 
harmed? Could your brand be harmed? 
Is My Physical Security Sufficient? 
Checking for Poor Physical Security includes: 
 Reviewing how easily a device can be disassembled and data storage mediums 
accessed or removed 
 Reviewing the use of external ports such as USB to determine if data can be 
accessed on the device without disassembling the device. 
 Reviewing the number of physical external ports to determine if all are required 
for proper device function 
 Reviewing the administrative interface to determine if external ports such as USB 
can be deactivated 
 Reviewing the administrative interface to determine if administrative capabilities 
can be limited to local access only 
How Do I Physically Secure My Device? 
Adequate physical security requires: 
1. Ensuring data storage medium cannot be easily removed. 
2. Ensuring stored data is encrypted at rest. 
3. Ensuring USB ports or other external ports cannot be used to maliciously 
access the device. 
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4. Ensuring device cannot be easily disassembled. 
5. Ensuring only required external ports such as USB are required for the 
product to funtion 
6. Ensuring the product has the ability to limit administrative capabilities 
 
Example Attack Scenarios 
Scenario #1: The device can be easily disassembled and storage medium is an 
unencrypted SD card. 
SD card can be removed and inserted into a card reader to be modified or copied. 
Scenario #2: USB ports are present on the device. 
Custom software could be written to take advantage of features such as updating via 
the USB port to modify the original device software. 
In both cases, an attacker is able to access the original device software and make 
modifications or simply copy specific target data. 
 
3.2 PRIVACY ISSUES 
The IoT provides organizations with powerful tools for collecting and analyzing data. 
This data comes in many forms, and in many cases with the IoT, there is residual 
data that is either collected or can be assembled through careful analysis. As 
organizations begin to adopt the IoT we will see the placement of sensors, video 
cameras, and other hardware aimed at collecting information. These IoT components 
will be deployed pervasively in public spaces as well as private homes, and in some 
cases even worn by individuals. Many IoT components will include the use of Global 
Positioning System (GPS) trackers that can provide location-tracking of individuals or 
those individuals’ assets (e.g., cars/telephones). Another aspect of the IoT is that 
many IoT systems will overlap in regards to the types of data that is collected. As 
such, the potential to expose sensitive information in aggregate is raised, even if the 
two collection systems are operated by entirely different entities. In these instances, 
enterprising marketers or malicious attackers can make use of this aggregate data to 
meet their objectives, without the knowledge of the individuals being tracked. 
One of the unique challenges related to privacy in the IoT is that there will soon be an 
ability to overwhelm society with data collection devices and sensors. These devices 
will sometimes be used maliciously and other times may inadvertently capture 
information about individuals that have not consented to being tracked. From a 
system-owner perspective it will be important to understand what actions are 
allowable on the data that is collected inadvertently from individuals. IoT sensors will 
also be used in ways that enhance a customer experience however. In these 
instances, the customer will be provided notification that they are interacting with 
some IoT system.  
It must be considered exactly what data persists about each user, and the impact 
that it stands to have on compliance and privacy regulations. The same applies to 
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compliance with industry standards such as PCI, which mandates that PII be 
encrypted both at rest and in transit. In addition to verifying that all sensitive 
information is protected sufficiently, it is also important to consider risks related to the 
supply chain. If components that make up your IoT system are compromised in the 
supply chain, the risk of exposure of sensitive information is high. Another 
consideration is related to who has access to stored privacy data. This data will likely 
be provided to third parties and access to any sensitive information should be logged 
for auditing purposes and checked for compliance against policies.  
Given the complexity of the IoT privacy landscape, it is important for any organization 
offering IoT-based capabilities to expend appropriate resources to ensure the 
safeguarding of stakeholder sensitive information. When architecting an IoT system, 
following Privacy-by-Design principles will allow for the integration of appropriate 
privacy safeguards within the system. These principles can be followed while 
designing the implementation of the various components that make up an IoT 
System for any particular organization. The European Union (EU) Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party released guidance in September 2014 stating that all IoT 
stakeholders should adopt these principles to implementations within any region of 
the world. The following sections provide an IoT-specific view of these principles that 
organizations can use to bolster their privacy programs to support IoT deployments. 
 
3.2.1 Privacy-by-Design Principles 
Users of IoT systems should be made aware of all of the data collected from or about 
them, and should be given the opportunity to opt out of data collection practices at a 
granular level. Recognizing the concerns that many of the IoT devices may not have 
proper user interface, companies should find suitable methods to provide the choice 
and notice to consumers. 
Proactive not Reactive; Preventive not Remedial  
Within the context of an IoT System, it is important to consider the potential privacy 
ramifications to all stakeholders prior to putting the system into an operational state. 
At the beginning, analysis will focus on data types collected to understand which are 
sensitive and what regulations apply to each data type. Next, more in-depth analysis 
should be undertaken to understand the indirect privacy ramifications of the various 
IoT component operations. As an example, when dealing with applications that track 
connected vehicles, it would be important to understand whether the tracking would 
expose driving patterns that, although anonymized, could be traced back to an 
individual or group when combined with data collected by other systems. Another 
case in point regards to the collection of data by smart meters that is fed to the utility 
companies for analysis. If access to this data is not tightly controlled, attackers can 
deduce when a person is at home exposing opportunity for physical attacks. Looking 
at privacy of data-in-aggregate vs. privacy of the data collected by a single system 
will allow for the identification of potentially serious privacy concerns prior to them 
being exposed or taken advantage of by unscrupulous persons. 
Privacy as the default  
Organizations that deploy IoT capabilities should take note of this, and ensure that 
they have built in privacy controls into their systems, on top of the device or 
application-specific privacy controls provided by any IoT vendor. 
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Privacy Embedded into Design 
Organizations implementing IoT functionality will be faced with first understanding the 
true privacy concerns of their stakeholders. As such, conducting an analysis to 
determine the data elements that an IoT system will process is critical. This should 
ideally be conducted in conjunction with the recommended threat analysis, and early 
on in the design of the IOT System.  
Once a thorough understanding of the potential indirect effects of data collection has 
been gained, the appropriate safeguards can be designed into the IoT System from 
the beginning, versus after a privacy concern has been raised or exploited. Also, 
companies should reevaluate their personal data breach notification program to 
cover the aspects related to IoT. 
Full Functionality — Positive Sum, not Zero-Sum 
There is typically a balance between the objectives of functionality and security that 
must be maintained to ensure that any particular system works correctly, meets 
business objectives, and is still secure. The same can be said of privacy. In the case 
of the IoT, it is critically important that trade-offs between functionality, security and 
privacy be made early on in the design process in order to ensure that all objectives 
are met equally. Identifying a privacy issue well into the operational life of an IoT 
system will make the process of retrofitting privacy controls challenging. Adhere to 
these principles of Privacy-by-Design to identify and implement those trade-offs when 
the cost of doing so is relatively minor during design of the IoT system. 
End-to-End Security — Lifecycle Protection 
Within the IoT, data collected will have a long lifespan. It is important to consider the 
full lifespan of the data collected, both within the collecting organization and within 
any third parties to which it is provided. Stakeholders should be made aware of when 
data is provided to third parties, the controls used to secure it, and how and when the 
data is disposed of.  
Lifecycle protection also applies to second-order data (information about people that 
is inferred or determined based on primary data) as well. For instance, if a sensor in 
your car collects how far, where, how fast, and other attributes of your driving habits, 
then someone can infer various things about you, for example, your shopping or 
working habits, or who you socialize or interact with. The owner of the data (e.g., the 
car company) may erase your primary data upon sale of your vehicle, but in fact keep 
all the inferred information (social connection, shopping habits, etc.). 
Visibility and Transparency 
Stakeholders should be able to easily identify the data collected from them for any 
particular IoT system, as well as the planned or potential uses for that data. 
Stakeholders should also be allowed to opt in to data collection, at both a coarse and 
granular level. As an example, if an application tracks their driving patterns (e.g., for 
insurance purposes), the user should be able to explicitly authorize the use of their 
data for that purpose (coarse). The user should also be able to explicitly authorize 
individual data elements if so desired, for example the storage of driving patterns or 
history obtained through GPS. 
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Respect for User Privacy 
Maintaining the privacy of stakeholder information will eventually become a 
discriminating factor for companies in the era of the IoT. With so many opportunities 
to mishandle user privacy, the organizations that take the necessary steps to 
safeguard sensitive information will be viewed far more favorably than the ones that 
do not. Given this, it is important to instill a culture of privacy awareness within the 
organization. This could include appointing one or more privacy advocates to 
evaluate the privacy impacts of any new IoT system being implemented. These 
people would ideally be given the authority to mandate changes to IoT system 
designs in the event that privacy concerns are identified.  
User privacy is also concerning from an indirect perspective. In the case of some IoT 
devices, for example smart glasses, the user has consented to privacy clauses, but 
the observed party most likely has not. Further research must be conducted to 
understand the impacts and regulations required around these type of scenarios. 
Privacy Impact Assessment 
If it is found that a device collects, processes or stores Privacy Protected 
Information (PPI), more stringent controls will be required. These controls 
should be a mix of policy-based and technical. For example:  
 Provisioning of the device may require more administrative approvals  
 A review by Internal Audit or Compliance should be conducted to determine if 
it is viable to have PPI data on IoT devices  
 Data stored on the device should be encrypted using sufficiently strong 
cryptographic algorithms  
 Data transmitted from/to the device should be encrypted using sufficiently 
strong cryptographic algorithms  
 Access to the device, both physical and logical, should be restricted to 
authorized personnel  
 
There are various recommendations on privacy requirements that should be 
considered based on region, including:  
 North America  
o Internet of Things, Privacy and Security in a Connected World, Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Staff Report  
 Europe  
o Privacy Recommendations for the IoT, WP29 of the EU (European data 
protection advisory body)  
 
 
3.3 THREAT MODELLING 
Threat modelling in cyber security science is a structured approach to identifying, 
quantifying and addressing threats. Threat modelling allows system security staff to 
communicate the potential damage of security flaws and prioritize remediation 
efforts. 
The threat modelling covers the assets, which refers to what data and equipment 
should be secured, the threats which refers to what an attacked can do to the system 
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and the vulnerabilities of the device. Below we will approach a threat modelling for 
IOT devices. 
STEP 1 Identify Assets 
This is for cataloguing the various components of the IoT System that will be 
deployed. Consider not only the IoT devices but also the data stores and applications 
that the devices communicate and the users that interact with the system. 
Step 2: Create a System/ Architecture Overview  
This step provides a solid foundation for understanding not only the expected 
functionality of the IoT System, but also how an attacker could misuse the system. 
Begin with the process of documenting expected functionality and then spend time to 
consider and document misuse cases for the system. It is also important to create an 
architectural diagram that details the new IoT System and how the system interfaces 
with other enterprise computing resources and security systems. This diagram can 
also serve as the starting point for identifying trust boundaries, authentication and 
authorization mechanisms as well as logging compos.  
The creation of system architecture is aided through use case analysis. The following 
example use cases from the healthcare sector can provide insight into security 
considerations for IoT implementations. 
 
1. A person wears some type of monitor that reports through the cloud to his/her 
physician  
a. Under extreme circumstances, would first responders be automatically 
dispatched?  
b. Would a new pharmacy prescription be automatically generated (by some 
rule), or alternatively would the prescription information be routed to several 
pharmacies that would compete for the purchase?  
c. Would an appointment be auto-scheduled?  
d. Would health records be updated?  
e. If medical response is dispatched is data transferred to an ambulance?  
 
2. An implanted device receives a command  
a. Does the device use PKI? If so, can the device confirm revocation status of 
the sender?  
b. Can the device validate the message?  
c. Can the device create a secure link or session with the sender?  
d. Can the device request confirmation?  
 
3. A physician establishes a communication session with a smart home/home 
monitor  
a. Is the communication channel secured with PKI?  
b. Are PII and medical data transferred securely?  
c. Does the physician issue commands to devices? If so, is there integrity 
checking and nonrepudiation through logging?  
 
4. A hospital transfers a patient’s record or diagnosis to a computer or PDA  
a. Can the patient interact with hospital services, such as scheduling another 
appointment?  
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b. Can the patient confirm the authenticity of the message?  
c. Can the patient effectively remove the message?  
 
5. A patient’s blood donation is handled by an online analyzer  
a. Is the tracking number for the donor protected locally or centrally?  
b. Will the patient be notified directly of any finding?  
c. If the patient has an STD which agencies will be notified?  
d. What are the trust mechanisms?  
e. Will the blood packet be handled by a robot?  
f. Will the patient’s pharmacy or doctor be messaged on any particular finding?  
g. Will a maintenance center be messaged about the state of the analyzer?  
 
7. In an emergency, multiple first responders are dispatched  
a. Is medical data transferred securely to the correct ambulance?  
b. Can responders communicate patient data securely? Is it through point-to-
point or central routing?  
c. Is security, trust and privacy managed by multiple trust chains?  
 
8. A pharmaceutical company issues an alert regarding drug infusion pumps  
a. Is the pharmaceutical company’s message trusted by pharmacies?  
b. Does the alert impact a patient’s dispensing device?  
c. Does a doctor issue controls to the dispensing device?  
d. Does the infusion pump have closed loop communications to the 
controller/monitor?  
 
9. A doctor performs tele surgery using a robot  
a. Is the communication channel trusted and secure?  
b. Is the robot’s distinguished name trusted with the console?  
c. Does the communication depend on DNS?  
d. What is the strength of the algorithms and key lengths use by the IP VPN?  
e. What is the trust chain and CRL management for the entire topology?  
f. Are backup communications channels trusted at the same level as the 
primary?  
g. Are pharmaceutical providers and records keeping updated in real time?  
 
10. A government agency issues a health alert that affects implanted devices  
a. In what order are stakeholders notified? (doctors, pharmacies, 
manufacturers, system administrators, etc.)  
b. Is the message authenticated and verified?  
c. If a device is recalled, what databases need to be updated?  
d. Is the inventory managed to ensure that all devices are properly 
administered?  
 
11. An implanted or wearable device needs updating  
a. Is the update remotely managed?  
b. Is there two-way trust between the device and the central server?  
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c. Is the channel secure and trusted?  
d. Is the inventory managed to ensure that all devices are properly managed?  
e. Are stakeholders notified if procedures or instructions change?  
f. Is the pharmacy notified if drugs are involved?  
 
12. The controlling physician for a specific device is replaced by another physician  
a. Are credentials managed centrally or locally?  
b. Is there a two-way trust between the physician and the device?  
c. Can the device be updated remotely to assign a new trust?  
 
13. A manufacturer alters its instructions for a remotely controlled medical device  
a. Is configuration management properly maintained, so that stakeholders 
know the version of devices/instructions?  
b. Are medical universities included as part of the stakeholders?  
c. Is there an authoritative database for configuration management?  
 
14. In a connected vehicle environment an ambulance/first responder vehicle 
coordinates patient records with a medical provider  
a. Are the communications protected with PKI?  
b. Is there two-way trust between the ambulance and the medical provider?  
c. Are patient records purged after the patient has been dispatched?  
d. Is on-board equipment remotely managed?  
 
15. A patient with an implanted device dials 911  
a. Is the patient data made available to the dispatcher?  
b. Can the dispatcher route data to a remote provider or doctor?  
c. Is a two-way trust relationship established?  
d. Are patient records automatically updated?  
e. Can information be securely communicated with an ambulance?  
 
16. A private cloud is deployed in South America to serve remote medical 
communities  
a. Is infrastructure auditable to verify that security standards are met?  
b. Does the system support remotely connected devices?  
c. Is there two-way trust with the remote clients?  
d. How are stakeholder identities authenticated?  
 
17. Nano biomedical devices are remotely deployed  
a. Are two-way trust relationships established with the central facility?  
b. Is each component in the topology trusted?  
c. Are recovered modules properly protected from sensitive medical 
information? (physical security)  
d. Is the inventory tracked securely?  
Once the logical architecture view is complete, in is important to identify and examine 
the specific technologies that will make up the IoT System. This includes 
understanding and documenting lower level details regarding the IoT devices, such 
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as the processor type and operating system. This will provide information needed to 
understand the specific types of vulnerabilities that may eventually be exposed and 
define processes for how and how often patches and firmware updates should be 
applied. Understanding and documenting the protocols that are used by each IoT 
device will also allow for updates to the architecture, especially if gaps are found in 
the encryption applied to the data transmitted throughout the system and the 
organization. 
Step 3: Decompose the IoT System  
At this stage, the focus is on understanding the life cycle of data as it flows through 
the system. Developing this understanding will allow for the identification of 
vulnerable or weak points within the security architecture that must be addressed. 
Identify and document the entry points for data within the system. In an IoT system, 
these entry points are typically sensors of some type. Trace the flow of data from the 
entry points and document the various components that interact with that data 
throughout the system. Identify high profile targets for attackers — these may be 
points within the system that aggregate or store data, or it may be high value sensors 
that require significant protections to maintain the overall integrity of the system. At 
the end of this activity a good understanding of the attack surface of the new IoT 
system will be had. 
Once you decompose the IoT system, shouldn’t the next step be to design an 
architecture to protect the system? Why not give them a notional protective 
architecture? This could be where some of the elements of the SdP can be 
introduced. Based upon Junaid’s comments I have included a notional diagram that 
we can adapt for the IoT environment 
1. Don’t allow anything to connect to them 
2. Authenticate to the gateways 
3. Use Authorization to Elevate Trust 
4. Mitigate the theft of keys 
5. Deny all connections 
6. Require authorization to initiate communication 
7. Use independent communication port for admins 
8. Audit logging 
9. Pin communications and updates the Root 
10. Use Secure boot 
11. Use hardened OS 
12. Application Whitelisting 
13. File Integrity Monitoring 
14. Audit logging 
15. Updates Response 
Step 4: Identify and Document the Threats  
The popular STRIDE model can be applied to IoT System deployments. Use well 
known vulnerability repositories to better understand the environment, such as 
MITRE’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database. Uncovering the unique 
threats to any particular IoT instantiation will be guided by these threat types: 
 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:01:46 EET - 137.108.70.7
 
 53 
 
Threat Type Iot Description 
Spoofing Identity  
 
Examine the system for threats related to the spoofing 
of machine identity and the ability for an attacker to 
overcome automated trust relationships between 
devices. Carefully examine the authentication protocols 
employed to set up secure communications between 
various devices (M2M) and between devices and 
applications that make use of data provided by these 
devices. Examine the process for provisioning of 
identities to each IoT device and ensure that there are 
proper procedural controls in place to limit the ability to 
introduce a rogue device into the system.  
 
Tampering with 
Data  
 
Examine the path of data across the entire IoT system. 
Identify points in the system that provide an opportunity 
to tamper with the data at points of collection, 
processing, transport and storage. Carefully examine 
implementation of authorization mechanisms to ensure 
that data tampering is effectively dealt with.  
 
Repudiation  
 
Examine the IoT system design for nodes within the 
system that are critical data providers. These are likely 
sets of sensors that provide various data for analysis. In 
the case of the IoT, it is important to be able to trace 
back data to a source and ensure that it was indeed the 
expected source that provided that data. Examine the 
IoT system for weaknesses that would allow an attacker 
to inject a rogue node that would feed bad data into the 
system in an attempt to confuse upstream processes or 
take the system out of an operational state. Ensure that 
attackers are not able to abuse the intended 
functionality of IoT systems e.g. illegal operations are 
disabled or not allowed. State changes and time 
variations (e.g. disrupting message sequencing) should 
be taken into account.  
 
Information 
Disclosure  
 
Examine the path of data across the entire IoT system, 
including the backend processing systems. Ensure that 
any device that processes sensitive information has 
been identified and that proper encryption controls have 
been implemented to guard against disclosure of that 
information. Identify data storage nodes within the IoT 
system and ensure that data-at-rest encryption controls 
have been applied. Examine the IoT system for 
instances where IoT devices are vulnerable to being 
physically stolen and ensure that proper controls, such 
as key zeroization have been considered.  
 
Denial of Service  Perform an activity that maps each IoT system to 
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 business goals, in an effort to ensure that appropriate 
Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning has 
occurred. Examine the throughput provided for each 
node in the system and ensure that it is sufficient to 
withstand relevant DoS attacks. Examine the 
messaging structures (e.g., data busses), data 
structures, improper use of variables and APIs used 
within applicable IoT components and determine if there 
are vulnerabilities that would allow a rogue node to 
drown out the transmissions of a legitimate node.  
Implementers of the IoT should also consider rate 
limiting APIs to mitigate DoS attacks.  
Elevation of 
Privilege  
 
Examine the administration capabilities provided by the 
various IoT devices that make up an IoT system. In 
some cases, there is only one level of authentication, 
which allows for configuration of device details. In other 
cases, distinct administrator accounts may be available. 
Identify instances where there are weaknesses in the 
ability to segregate administrative functions from user-
level functions within IoT nodes. Identify weaknesses in 
the authentication methods employed by IoT nodes in 
order to design appropriate authentication controls into 
the system.  
 
Bypassing 
Physical Security  
 
Examine the physical protection mechanisms offered by 
each IoT device and plan mitigations where possible 
against any identified weaknesses. This is especially 
true for IoT deployments that are placed in public or 
remote areas.  
 
Social 
Engineering 
Intrusions  
 
Train staff to guard against social engineering attempts 
and regularly monitor assets for suspicious behavior.  
 
Supply Chain 
Errors  
 
Understand the various technological components that 
make up IoT devices and systems and keep track of 
vulnerabilities related to any of these technology layers.  
 
Network 
Intrusions  
 
Regularly monitor networks for suspicious behavior.  
 
 
 
3.4 ATTACK SURFACE 
The Iot Attack Surface Areas Project provides a list of attack surface that should be 
understood by manufacturers ,developers, security researchers and those looking to 
deploy or implement IoT technologies within their organizations. Below will be 
referred the attack surface and the vulnerabilities for the specific attack surface 
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 Ecosystem Access Control 
 Implicit trust between components 
 Enrollment security 
 Decommissioning system 
 Lost access procedures 
 Device Memory  
 Clear text usernames 
 Clear text passwords 
 Third-Party credentials 
 Encryption Keys 
 Device Physical Interfaces 
 Firmware extraction 
 User command line interface(CLI) 
 Admin command line interface(CLI) 
 Privilege escalation 
 Reset to insecure state 
 Removal of storage media 
 Tamper resistance 
 Debug port 
 Device ID/Serial number exposure 
 Device Web interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account Lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Device Firmware 
 Hardcoded credentials 
 Sensitive information disclosure 
 Sensitive URL disclosure 
 Encryption Keys 
 Encryption (symmetric ,asymmetric) 
 Firmware version display and/or last update date 
 Backdoor accounts 
 Vulnerable services (web, ssh, tftp, etc.) 
 Security related function API exposure 
 Firmware downgrade 
 Device Network Services 
 Information disclosure 
 User CLI 
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 Administrative CLI 
 Injection 
 Denial of Service 
 Unencrypted Services 
 Poorly implemented encryption 
 Test/Development Services 
 Buffer Overflow 
 UPnP 
 Vulnerable UDP Services 
 DoS 
 Device Firmware OTA update block 
 Replay attack 
 Lack of payload verification 
 Lack of message integrity check 
 Administrative Interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Security/encryption options 
 Logging options 
 Two-factor authentication 
 Inability to wipe device 
 Local Data Storage 
 Unencrypted data 
 Data encrypted with discovered keys 
 Lack of data integrity checks 
 Use of static same enc/dec key 
 Cloud Web Interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Transport encryption 
 Insecure password recovery mechanism 
 Two-factor authentication 
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 Third-party Backend APIs 
 Unencrypted PII sent 
 Encrypted PII sent 
 Device information leaked 
 Location leaked 
 Update Mechanism 
 Update sent without encryption 
 Updates not signed 
 Update location writable 
 Update verification 
 Update authentication 
 Malicious update 
 Missing update mechanism 
 No manual update mechanism 
 Mobile Application 
 Implicitly trusted by device or cloud 
 Username enumeration 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Weak passwords 
 Insecure data storage 
 Transport encryption 
 Insecure password recovery mechanism 
 Two-factor authentication 
 Vendor Backend APIs 
 Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application 
 Weak authentication 
 Weak access controls 
 Injection attacks 
 Hidden services 
 Ecosystem Communication 
 Health checks 
 Heartbeats 
 Ecosystem commands 
 Deprovisioning 
 Pushing updates 
 Network Traffic 
 LAN 
 LAN to Internet 
 Short range 
 Non-standard 
 Wireless (WiFi, Z-wave, Zigbee, Bluetooth) 
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 Protocol fuzzing 
 Authentication/Authorization 
 Authentication/Authorization related values (session key, token, cookie, 
etc.) disclosure 
 Reusing of session key, token, etc. 
 Device to device authentication 
 Device to mobile Application authentication 
 Device to cloud system authentication 
 Mobile application to cloud system authentication 
 Web application to cloud system authentication 
 Lack of dynamic authentication 
 Privacy 
 User data disclosure 
 User/device location disclosure 
 Differential privacy 
 Hardware (Sensors) 
 Sensing Environment Manipulation 
 Tampering (Physically) 
 Damaging (Physically) 
 
Attack surfaces will now be combined with the most common vulnerabilities that 
Internet of things face: 
 Username enumeration vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability 
are administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. With this vulnerability it is given the ability to collect a set of valid 
usernames by interacting with the authentication mechanism. 
 Weak passwords vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability are 
administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. It is given the ability to set account passwords that are easily be 
cracked like ‘1234’ or ‘123456’ for example. 
 Account lockout vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability are 
administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. With this vulnerability it is given the ability to continue sending 
authentication attempts after 3-5 failed login attempts 
 Unencrypted devices vulnerability. The attack surface for this vulnerability is 
the device networks services. Network services are not properly encrypted to 
prevent eavesdropping by attackers. 
 Two factor authentication lack vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this 
vulnerability are administrative interface, cloud web interface and mobile 
application. The lack of two-factor authentication mechanisms such as a 
security token or fingerprint scanner. 
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 Poorly Implemented Encryption vulnerability. It targets device network 
services. The encryption is implemented however it is improperly configured or 
is not being properly updated, e.g. SSL v2. 
 Update sent without encryption vulnerability. It targets the update mechanism 
and the updates are transmitted over the network without using TLS or 
encrypting the update file itself. 
 Update location writable, it targets the update mechanism. The storage 
location for update files is world writable potentially allowing firmware to be 
modified and distributed to all users. 
 Denial of service vulnerability. The attack surface for this vulnerability is the 
device network service. The service can be attacked in a way that denies 
service to that service or the entire device. 
  Removal of storage media vulnerability. It targets the device physical 
interfaces and it gives the ability to physically remove the storage media from 
the device. 
  No manual update mechanism, it targets the update mechanism and there is 
no ability to manually force an update check for the device. 
 Missing update mechanism, it targets the update mechanism and there is no 
ability to update the device. 
 Firmware version display and/or last update date. It targets the device 
firmware and the current firmware version is not displayed and/or the last 
update date is not displayed. 
  
3.5 FIRMWARE ANALYSIS 
The Iot Attack Surface Areas Project provides a list of attack surface that should be 
understood by manufacturers, developers, security researchers and those looking to 
deploy or implement IoT technologies within their organizations. Below will be 
referred the attack surface and the vulnerabilities for the specific attack surface 
 Ecosystem Access Control 
 Implicit trust between components 
 Enrollment security 
 Decommissioning system 
 Lost access procedures 
 Device Memory  
 Clear text usernames 
 Clear text passwords 
 Third-Party credentials 
 Encryption Keys 
 Device Physical Interfaces 
 Firmware extraction 
 User command line interface(CLI) 
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 Admin command line interface(CLI) 
 Privilege escalation 
 Reset to insecure state 
 Removal of storage media 
 Tamper resistance 
 Debug port 
 Device ID/Serial number exposure 
 Device Web interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account Lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Device Firmware 
 Hardcoded credentials 
 Sensitive information disclosure 
 Sensitive URL disclosure 
 Encryption Keys 
 Encryption (symmetric, asymmetric) 
 Firmware version display and/or last update date 
 Backdoor accounts 
 Vulnerable services (web, ssh, tftp, etc.) 
 Security related function API exposure 
 Firmware downgrade 
 
 Device Network Services 
 Information disclosure 
 User CLI 
 Administrative CLI 
 Injection 
 Denial of Service 
 Unencrypted Services 
 Poorly implemented encryption 
 Test/Development Services 
 Buffer Overflow 
 UPnP 
 Vulnerable UDP Services 
 DoS 
 Device Firmware OTA update block 
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 Replay attack 
 Lack of payload verification 
 Lack of message integrity check 
 
 Administrative Interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Security/encryption options 
 Logging options 
 Two-factor authentication 
 Inability to wipe device 
 
 Local Data Storage 
 Unencrypted data 
 Data encrypted with discovered keys 
 Lack of data integrity checks 
 Use of static same enc/dec key 
 
 Cloud Web Interface 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site Request Forgery 
 Username enumeration 
 Weak passwords 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Transport encryption 
 Insecure password recovery mechanism 
 Two-factor authentication 
 
 Third-party Backend APIs 
 Unencrypted PII sent 
 Encrypted PII sent 
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 Device information leaked 
 Location leaked 
 
 Update Mechanism 
 Update sent without encryption 
 Updates not signed 
 Update location writable 
 Update verification 
 Update authentication 
 Malicious update 
 Missing update mechanism 
 No manual update mechanism 
 
 Mobile Application 
 Implicitly trusted by device or cloud 
 Username enumeration 
 Account lockout 
 Known default credentials 
 Weak passwords 
 Insecure data storage 
 Transport encryption 
 Insecure password recovery mechanism 
 Two-factor authentication 
 
 Vendor Backend APIs 
 Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application 
 Weak authentication 
 Weak access controls 
 Injection attacks 
 Hidden services 
 
 Ecosystem Communication 
 Health checks 
 Heartbeats 
 Ecosystem commands 
 Deprovisioning 
 Pushing updates 
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 Network Traffic 
 LAN 
 LAN to Internet 
 Short range 
 Non-standard 
 Wireless (WiFi, Z-wave, Zigbee, Bluetooth) 
 Protocol fuzzing 
 
 Authentication/Authorization 
 Authentication/Authorization related values (session key, token, cookie, 
etc.) disclosure 
 Reusing of session key, token, etc. 
 Device to device authentication 
 Device to mobile Application authentication 
 Device to cloud system authentication 
 Mobile application to cloud system authentication 
 Web application to cloud system authentication 
 Lack of dynamic authentication 
 
 Privacy 
 User data disclosure 
 User/device location disclosure 
 Differential privacy 
 
 Hardware (Sensors) 
 Sensing Environment Manipulation 
 Tampering (Physically) 
 Damaging (Physically) 
 
Attack surfaces will now be combined with the most common vulnerabilities that 
Internet of things face: 
 Username enumeration vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability 
are administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. With this vulnerability it is given the ability to collect a set of valid 
usernames by interacting with the authentication mechanism. 
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 Weak passwords vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability are 
administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. It is given the ability to set account passwords that are easily be 
cracked like ‘1234’ or ‘123456’ for example. 
 Account lockout vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this vulnerability are 
administrative interface, device web interface, cloud interface and mobile 
application. With this vulnerability it is given the ability to continue sending 
authentication attempts after 3-5 failed login attempts 
 Unencrypted devices vulnerability. The attack surface for this vulnerability is 
the device networks services. Network services are not properly encrypted to 
prevent eavesdropping by attackers. 
 Two factor authentication lack vulnerability. The attack surfaces for this 
vulnerability are administrative interface, cloud web interface and mobile 
application. The lack of two-factor authentication mechanisms such as a 
security token or fingerprint scanner. 
 Poorly Implemented Encryption vulnerability. It targets device network 
services. The encryption is implemented however it is improperly configured or 
is not being properly updated, e.g. SSL v2. 
 Update sent without encryption vulnerability. It targets the update mechanism 
and the updates are transmitted over the network without using TLS or 
encrypting the update file itself. 
 Update location writable, it targets the update mechanism. The storage 
location for update files is world writable potentially allowing firmware to be 
modified and distributed to all users. 
 Denial of service vulnerability. The attack surface for this vulnerability is the 
device network service. The service can be attacked in a way that denies 
service to that service or the entire device. 
  Removal of storage media vulnerability. It targets the device physical 
interfaces and it gives the ability to physically remove the storage media from 
the device. 
  No manual update mechanism, it targets the update mechanism and there is 
no ability to manually force an update check for the device. 
 Missing update mechanism, it targets the update mechanism and there is no 
ability to update the device. 
 Firmware version display and/or last update date. It targets the device 
firmware and the current firmware version is not displayed and/or the last 
update date is not displayed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1 PENETRATION TESTING METHODOLOGY 
A penetration test, is an attack on a computer system or a device that looks for 
security weaknesses, potentially gaining access to the computer's features and data. 
Penetration tests can be automated with software applications or they can be 
performed manually. Either way, the process includes gathering information about 
the target before the test (reconnaissance), identifying possible entry points, 
attempting to break in (either virtually or for real) and reporting back the findings. 
Until now, the internet of things penetration testing is not so famous even the vendors 
everyday distribute to the market new devices. One testing methodology is from 
OWASP. This testing guidance is developed for the most common and well known 
vulnerabilities. 
INSECURE WEB INTERFACE  
To test this vulnerability, we must assess any web interface to determine if weak 
passwords are allowed. Assess the account lockout mechanism, assess the web 
interface for cross side scripting attacks, SQLi and CSRF vulnerabilities and other 
application vulnerabilities and finally assess the use of HTTPS to protect transmitted 
information. 
LACK OF TRANSPORT ENCRYPTION 
To test lack of transport encryption we must assess the solution to determine the use 
of encrypted communication between the devices and internet. Assess the solution to 
determine if accepted encryption practices are used and if proprietary protocols are 
avoided and assess the solution to determine if a firewall option is available. 
INSUFFICIENT SECURITY CONFIGURABILITY 
To test this vulnerability, we must assess the solution to determine if password 
security options are available, assess the solution to determine if encryption options 
(Enabling AES-256 where AES-128 is the default setting) are available and assesse 
the solution to determine if logging for security events. 
POOR PHYSICAL SECURITY 
To test poor physical security, we must assess the device to ensure it utilizes a 
minimal number of physical external ports (e.g. USB ports) on the device and assess 
the device to determine if it can be accessed via unintended methods such as 
through ab unnecessary USB port. 
INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION/AUTHORIZATION 
To solve such a problem, we must assess the solution for the use of strong 
passwords where authentication is needed, assess the solution for implementation 
two-factor authentication where possible, assess password recovery mechanisms, 
assess the solution for the option to require strong passwords, assess the solution for 
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the option to force password expiration after a specific period and assess the solution 
for the option to change the default username and password. 
INSECURE CLOUD INTERFACE 
For insecure cloud interface we must assess the cloud interfaces for security 
vulnerabilities, assess the cloud-based web interface to ensure It disallows weak 
passwords, assess the cloud-based web interface to ensure it includes an account 
lockout mechanism, assess the cloud-based web interface to determine if two-factor 
authentication is used, assess any cloud interfaces for cross side scripting attacks 
,SQLi and CSRF vulnerabilities and other vulnerabilities, assess all cloud interfaces 
to ensure transport encryption is used and assess the cloud interfaces to determine if 
the option to require strong password is available. 
INSECURE SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE 
We must assess the device to ensure it includes update capability and can be 
updated quickly when vulnerabilities are discovered, assess the device to ensure it 
uses encrypted update files and that the files are transmitted using encryption and 
assess the device to ensure it uses signed files and then validates that file before 
installation. 
PRIVACY CONCERNS 
We must assess the solution to determine the amount of personal information 
collected, assess the solution to determine if collected personal data is properly 
protected using encryption at rest and in transit and assess the solution to determine 
if ensuring data is de-identified or anonymized. 
INSECURE MOBILE INTERFACE 
We must assess the mobile interface to ensure it disallows weak passwords, we 
must assess the mobile interface to ensure it includes an account lockout 
mechanism, we must assess the mobile interface to determine if it implements two-
factor authentication, we must assess the mobile interface to determine if the option 
to require strong passwords is available, assess the mobile interface to determine if 
the option to force password expiration after a specific period is available, assess the 
mobile interface to determine if the option to change the default username and 
password is available and assess the mobile interface to determine the amount of 
personal information collected. 
 
INSECURE NETWORK SERVICES 
We must assess the solution to ensure network services don’t respond poorly to 
buffer overflow, fuzzing od denial of service attacks and assess the solution to 
ensure test ports are not present. 
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4.2 VULNERABLE IOT DEVICES SEARCH 
For our research of vulnerable Internet of Things online devices we will use a search 
engine called Shodan and google dorks. 
Shodan Search Engine 
Shodan is a computer search  engine designed be web developer John 
Matherly. It is a search engine for Internet connected devices but it is much different 
than content search engines like Google, Yahoo or Bing. Typical search engine crawl 
for data on web pages and then they index this data for searching. Shodan 
interrogates ports and grabs the resulting banners, then indexes the banners rather 
than the web content for searching. The resulting banners are textual information that 
describes a service on a device. The content of the banner varies depending the type 
of service. Below is an example of an HTTP banner: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Server: nginx/1.1.19 
Date: Sat, 03 Oct 2015 06:09:24 GMT 
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 
Content-Length: 6466 
Connection: keep-alive 
Below is another banner for the Siemens S7 industrial control system protocol: 
Copyright: Original Siemens Equipment 
PLC name: S7_Turbine 
Module type: CPU 313C 
Unknown (129): Boot Loader A 
Module: 6ES7 313-5BG04-0AB0 v.0.3 
Basic Firmware: v.3.3.8 
Module name: CPU 313C 
Serial number of module: S Q-D9U083642013 
Plant identification: 
Basic Hardware: 6ES7 313-5BG04-0AB0 v.0.3 
The basic operation of Shodan is searching and this can be done by entering search terms into a text 
boxlike the one below.  
 
For searching terms Boolean operators can be used to include or exclude query 
terms. 
In addition to the banner, Shodan also grabs meta-data about the device such as its 
geographic, location, hostname, operating system and more. To view and narrow 
those terms it is possible for a user to use some basic filters: 
 After/before: limit results by date  
 Country: filter results by two letter country code 
 Hostname: filters results by specified text in the hostname of domain 
 Net: filter results by a specific IP range or subnet 
 Operation system: search for specific operation systems 
 Ports: narrow the search for specific services 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 13:01:46 EET - 137.108.70.7
 
 68 
 
In our research for vulnerable IoT devices Shodan will be used within an ethical and 
“white hat” approach. 
Google Dorks 
Another common method for finding vulnerable online devices, is the use of 
Google search engine. Either by using Google’s web interface and building queries 
or using already released Google dorks, it is possible to find and access vulnerable 
Internet of Things devices. A Google dork query is a search string that uses 
advanced search operators to find information that is not readily available on a 
website. 
Google dorking, also known as Google hacking can return information that is 
difficult to locate through simple search queries. That includes information that is not 
intended for public viewing but that has not been adequately protected. Google 
dorking is a passive attack method and can return usernames, passwords, and 
vulnerabilities. 
Below are some advanced search parameters examples:  
 intitle, allintitle 
 inurl, allinurl 
 filetype 
 allintext 
 site 
 link 
 inanchor 
 daterange 
 cache 
 info 
 related 
Examples of valid queries that use advanced operators include these: 
 _ intitle:Google. This query will return pages that have the word Google in their 
title. 
 _ intitle:“index of”. This query will return pages that have the phrase index of in 
their title. Remember from the previous chapter that this query could also be 
given as intitle:index.of, since the period serves as any character.This 
technique also makes it easy to supply a phrase without having to type the 
spaces and the quotation marks around the phrase. 
 _ intitle:“index of” private .This query will return pages that have the phrase 
index of in their title and also have the word private anywhere in the page, 
including in the URL, the title, the text, and so on. Notice that intitle only 
applies to the phrase index of and not the word private, since the first 
unquoted space follows the index of phrase. Google interprets that space as 
the end of your advanced operator search term and continues processing the 
rest of the query. 
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 _ intitle:“index of”“backup files” .This query will return pages that have 
the phrase index of in their title and the phrase backup files anywhere in the page, 
including the URL, the title, the text, and so on. Again, notice that intitle only applies 
to the phrase index of. 
  
4.3 VULNERABLE IOT DEVICES USE CASE 
For privacy issues at the following screenshots some of the data has been masked. 
The operational systems that was used at the research were Kali Linux v2.0, 
Windows 7 Pro and  Parrot Security Linux OS. Below there will be screenshots from 
our research which they will present the location of the vulnerable IOT devices, the 
proof of the access that was gained and other relevant information. In the table below 
are shown the amount of the search results and the Iot device or system that used 
for the use case 
 
 
IOT DEVICE  TOTAL VULNERABLE DEVICES 
Axis Webcams 918  
WebcamXp5 1310 
Hp Officejet Printer 513 
Ricoh Photocopier 79 
Smart Wifi Thermostats 126 
Heating System DDC400 125 
Heatmiser Smart Thermostat 578 
Rapsberry Pi Smart Home 610 
Loxone Smart Home 803 
Yamaha RX1 Smart Stereo  309 
Bticino Legrand Smart Home 1300 
Smart Metering 85 
CAT Self Drive Dump Trucks 146 
GAS Tank Levels 4226 
Fibaro Home Center 2 928 
Table 1 
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AXIS WEBCAMS  GOOGLE DORK 
Our search found 918 results of vulnerable webcams where has gained full access of 
settings and live view feed.  
 
Screenshot 1- Live view and PTZ control access 
 
Screenshot 2-Live view 
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WEBCAMXP5 GOOGLE DORK 
Our search found 1310 results of vulnerable webcams. Full access of settings gained 
and live view feed.  
 
Screenshot 3-Live view and PTZ access 
 
 
Screenshot 4 - Live view and PTZ access   
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Screenshot 5- Live view and PTZ access 
HP OFFICEJET PRINTERS GOOGLE DORKThe search found 513 results of 
vulnerable printers. Some of them located in Greek Universities like the one in the 
screenshot below. 
 
Screenshot 6 – Access to the printer settings and history 
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RICOH PHOTOCOPIER GOOGLE DORK 
The search returned 79 results which some them belonging to Educational Institutes 
as the screenshot below. 
 
Screenshot 7- Access to the printer settings and history 
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SMART WIFI THERMOSTATS 
The results were 126 mostly from EU. At Germany found 36 devices, at Italy 18 
devices, at France 11 devices, at Austria 10 devices and at Russia 9. When access 
was gained at the interface of the thermostat, it was possible to gain administrator 
access.  
 
Screenshot 8 – Map results 
 
Screenshot 8 – Thermostat’s Settings 
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IOT HEATING SYSTEMS CONTROL PANELS 
The search returned 125 results all from the EU. It was gained full operationally 
access and remote access control.  
 
Screenshot 9 – Results Map 
 
 
Screenshot 10 – ON/OFF of Heating Systems 
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Screenshot 11-System control 
HEATMISER SMART THERMOSTATS 
The search results were 578, all from EU and some of them from Greece. Full 
administrator access was gained. 
 
Screenshot 12 – Map results 
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Screenshot 13 – Heating program schedule timer settings 
 
Screenshot 14 – Temperature settings 
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RAPSBERRY PI SMART HOME AUTOMATION 
There were 610 results in all over the world and 11 results at Greece. Was  gained 
full administrator access and remote control of the devices that the raspberry pi 
controlled. 
 
Screenshot 15 - Map results 
 
Screenshot 16 - Lighting control 
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Screenshot 17 – Lighting control 
 
LOXONE SMART HOME 
The search returned 803 vulnerable systems which most of them were located in EU. 
When access gained all settings could be customized, gained full access remotely of 
the home systems like lighting, door automation, alarm security and others. 
 
Screenshot 18 – Auto lighting system ON/OFF timer 
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Screenshot 19 – System settings 
 
Screenshot 20 – System and lighting settings 
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Screenshot 21 – Temperature settings 
YAMAHA RX1 SMART STEREO SYSTEM 
The result returned 309 results from all over the world. It was gained full remote 
access of all the features of the device like volume and full admin access at settings 
configuration. 
 
Screenshot 22 - Map results 
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Screenshot 23 – Network access settings 
BTICINO LEGRAND SMART HOMEThere were 1300 results of vulnerable smart 
systems mostly in EU and 5 of them were in Greece. It was gained full access at 
lighting, door and window automation ,thermostat and air conditioning, cctv system, 
door camera and alarm system remotely. 
 
Screenshot 24- Map results 
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Screenshot 26- Main screen of alarm system 
 
Screenshot 27- Windows controlling system 
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Screenshot 28 – Lighting ON/OFF  
 
 
Screenshot 29 – Alarm system 
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Screenshot 30 – Main building front door system 
 
 
Screenshot 31 – System Home page 
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Screenshot 32 – ON/OFF burglar system 
 
SMART METERING 
They were found 85 smart meter vulnerable devices mostly in America. It was gained 
full admin system settings and live feed from the measurements 
 
Screenshot 33 – Network access settings 
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Screenshot 34 – Live metering results and overview 
 
CATERPILAR SELF DRIVE TRUCKS 
At the research that was done, were found 146 results of self-drive Caterpillar trucks. 
Access was gained at a lot of settings,real time monitoring and gps tracking. 
 
Screenshot 35 – Map results 
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Screenshot 36 – Truck’s information 
 
Screenshot 37 – Truck’s real time settings ,GPS info  
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GAS TANK LEVELS 
The search results were 4226 gas tanks where real time monitoring access was 
gained. Most of them were in America. 
 
Screenshot 38 – Map results 
 
FIBRARO HOME CENTER 2 
The results were 928 from all over the world. After the bypass of the login screen with 
the use of default credentials,full access administration was achieved.We took 
control of every device and sensor that was connected such as electrical door locks, 
lighting, multimedia system, HVAC system and other as shown in the screenshots 
below. 
 
Screenshot 38 – Door open/close,lighting ON/OFF,thermostat setting 
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Screenshot 39 – Lighting ON/OFF ,multimedia system  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Internet of Things continues to march forward and will accelerate with higher 
pace the coming years. The growth of more networks capable entities will regard to 
new potential attack surfaces and an explosive increase of cyber security issues. In 
this master thesis, security challenges and security threats that Internet of Things 
were analyzed. At the practical research that has be done, although we are at the 
beginning of the IoT technological era, a large amount of IoT devices are vulnerable. 
This shows that there is a very little concern from vendors for security design 
implementation. The vulnerable devices use case search was provided which 
showed that it is very easily to gain access to these devices. All these security issues 
conclude that it is important from vendors and end-users to gain deeper 
understanding of the threats that are facing. Internet of Things devices will be soon a 
vital part of every man’s life and is critical to solve and face the most issues. 
The internet of things will bring a better and more convenient life in the near future 
with many new advances about interacting with our world. However, internet of things 
will bring many challenges in the world of information technology and cyber security 
engineers making critical the continuous research and development of new 
approaches to ensure security and privacy.  
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APPENDIX 
The Google Dorks and the Shodan Queries that used in the use case of this master thesis are: 
Axis Webcams  
inurl:/view/viewer_index.shtml 
Webcamxp5 
intext:"powered by webcamXP 5" 
HP Officejet Printer 
inurl:/tcpipv6.htm 
Ricoh Photocopier 
inurl:"topPage.cgi" | inurl:"mainFrame.cgi" intext:"Web Image Monitor" 
Prolifix Thermostat 
Title:”Status&Amp;+Control” 
Heating System DDC400 
Title:”DDC4000” 
Rapsberry Pi Smart Home 
HomeAssistant/1.0 Python/ 
CAT Self Drive Dump Trucks 
Title:”VIMS-3G Web+Interface” 
Smart Metering 
Server: FNET+HTTP+-+Freescale+Embedded 
Loxone 
“loxone smart+home” 
Yamaha RX1 Smart Stereo  
Network_Module/1.0 
Gas Tanks Levels 
“IN-TANK INVENTORY” 
Heatmiser Thermostat 
Title:”Heatmiser Wifi + Thermostat” 
Bticino Legrand Smart Home 
Location:/iden.php 
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